134 



all, of the fundamental law of ocean space would be reexamined and possibly 

 renegotiated and revised. Tliis conference is now scheduled to begin formally late 

 in 1973 ; in fact, however, if not in form, it has already been underway for several 

 years. 



A look at some of the major features of these negotiations, as they have de- 

 veloped until now, with ixirticular attention to the role of the United States, 

 will be helpful. 



The issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, and the important preliminary 

 question wliether a limit on that breadth should be agreed internationally by 

 means of a new treaty, were the prime factors in the development of interest 

 on the part of the United States Grovernment in new negotiations on the law of the 

 sea. They remain a preoccupying consideration — a preoccupation which is. of 

 course, only a part of the legitimate concern of the United States for freedom 

 of navigation in the whole ocean. It now appears likely that, in a final treaty, 

 this one issue might well be resolved in favor of the position originally put 

 forth by the United States and the Soviet Union — that is to say, a territorial .sea 

 of 12 miles. Such a solution presupposes, however, that an arrangement accept- 

 able to the major maritime powers will have been worked out adequately pro- 

 tecting freedom of navigation through international straits which would be 

 newly enclosed by extending territorial waters to 12 miles. No such arrangement 

 clearly acceptable to all seems yet to have emerged. 



Moreover, if present indications continue, it seems increasingly likely that 

 agreement on a 12-mile territorial sea will be achieved only at the cost of ceding 

 to coastal states very extensive prerogatives in a wide coastal band — perhaps 

 200 miles or more. Substantial numbers of states now insist that these preroga- 

 tives should include ownership of, and the exclusive right to exploit and profit 

 from, the living and nonliving resources of the area, and the right to regulate 

 and control all or virtually all other activities for all purposes including environ- 

 mental protection, subject only to the reserved freedom of navigation and over- 

 flight (and perhaps other, less consequential reserved freedoms) which all 

 states would enjoy. As expounded by considerable numbers of developing coun- 

 tries, this exclusive economic resource zone would amount to an effective exten- 

 sion of national territory 200 miles into the ocean, with an exception carved out 

 for the right of navigation. The major competitor of this position, as regards 

 this intermediate area of 200 miles or so. is probably the United States concept of 

 a "trusteeship zone," embodied in a draft treaty put forward in 1970. The trust- 

 eeship zone would in practical fact resemble an exclusive economic resource 

 zone in many respects, but in important particulars would differ : the coastal 

 state, as "trustee" for the international community, would have the exclusive 

 right to manage and control exploitation. In so doing, it would lay down and 

 enforce measures of environmental protection. It would take a large share of the 

 proceeds of exploitation, but a designated portion would be dedicated to inter- 

 national community purposes, including the administrative co.sts of an ocean 

 management machinery. The United States trusteeship zone concept would apply 

 to mineral resource exploitation (as would the ocean management institutions 

 and the environmental protection devices envisaged in its proposal). The trustee- 

 ship area would be regarded as a part of an "international" area, which would 

 include the remainder of the ojien ocean as well. As regards environmental protec- 

 tion, the United States proposal envisages an international aiiparatus establish- 

 ing detailed protection standards for seabed exploitation oi)erations, which would 

 be applicable in the trustee zone as well as outside it. National regulations could 

 not be less exacting than the international ones, and enforcement would be the 

 prerogative of the coastal state. 



As the negotiations proceed, there will be pressure on the United States to 

 move increasingly closer to the exclusive economic resource zone concept of 

 many coastal developing countries, dropping or diluting various international 

 features of its original "trusteeship zone," in return for assurantvs of acceptably 

 unimpeded navigation throughout the whole ocean outside territorial waters, and 

 through international straits. Indeed, this has already happened to some extent. 

 The only substantial bloc of countries involved in the negotiation having a pro- 

 fessed stake in retention of significant international features for a seabed mineral 

 exploitation regime are the landlocked and "shelf locked" countries, whose 

 only direct commercial return from seabed mineral exploitation is likely to be in 

 the form of a portion of proceeds paid to an international community fund. 



Now where does the problem of protecting the ocean's environmental fit into all 

 this? It is an issue Itefore the c<niference. in the sense that it has carried on the 

 list of possible issues with which the preparatory committee for the conference is 



