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tion, the U.S. draft seabed convention contain.s vague, general provisions con- 

 cerning pollution arising from seabed development. Exploitation must not 

 "unjustifiably" interfere with other activities in the ocean, and "adequate" meas- 

 ures must be taken to protect the "safety" of the marine environment. Although 

 the Council may issue ecological "emergency order.s," no consideration is given 

 to preventing such occurrences through an advance review of projects to 

 scrutinize any significant environmental effects. 



In contrast to the lack of well conceived and articulately drafted environ- 

 mental provisions, the convention contains detailed rules in an annex on the 

 procedures for licenses, including initial fees, working requirements, submission 

 of work plans. Because of such provisions, some critics have described the U.S. 

 draft seabed treaty as a "benignly written mining code." 



There is no requirement of an environmental impact analysis by a propo.sed 

 licensee of the ISRA or a trustee coastal state. This requirement would not 

 present problems, for the companies with the technological sophistication to 

 develop seabed mineral resources are from western industrialized nations. They 

 have the ability to perform environmental analysis, like NEPA impact state- 

 ments. U.S. companies are already familiar with these procedure.s. This type 

 of environmental analysis performed by corporations of western nations would 

 not impose a burden on developing nations. More importantly, the trend in other 

 international organizations is to build environmental impact analysis into the 

 process of policy planning and review. The AVorld Bank has such procedures 

 and the United Nations after the Stockholm Conference, will implement that 

 type of development planning. Since under Annex Articles 7 and 8 a license 

 applicant must submit his "plans" of the proposed work, equipment, and 

 "methods," an environmental scrutiny should be made by the ISRA prior to 

 issuing the license. 



The convention contains provisions for liability in the event of environmental 

 damage. However, allocation of liabilities is primarily remedial. Rules of liability 

 are no substitute for the i)rotection afforded by environmental analysis prior 

 to issuing a seabed license. 



In brief, at the very least, an environmental impact analysis should be in- 

 corporated into the U.S. proposed seabed convention, or any other seabed re.gime 

 approved by the Conference on the Law of the Sea, to protect the marine 

 environment. 



Even if the U.S. seabed proposal were modified to strengthen ecological lan- 

 guage and require envii'onmental impact analysis, a further problem remains. 

 This is the conflict of interest inherent in an agency which promotes resource 

 development and purports to protect environmental values. In the United States, 

 this conflict resulted in the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. 

 Some federal agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, had a built in 

 conflict of interest in both promoting and regulating atomic energy. However, 

 while the A.E.C. was forced to comply with NEPA in the Calvert Cliffs decision, 

 there is no NEPA in international law. Nor is there an international Environ- 

 mental Protection Agency, although the U.N. Environment Secretariat may per- 

 form some functions like the EPA but vithout its ability to commence legal pro- 

 ceedings against polluters. In view of the limitations of international law re- 

 garding the environment, it is essential that in depth analysis be performed 

 now, before positions crystalize for the law of the sea conference. Further, the 

 U.S. seabed regime should be redrafted to avert or mitigate this potential conflict 

 of interest. 



Of all the nations proposing seabed regimes, only Canada has recognized this 

 serious conflict : 



"[T]he international seabed regime and machinery may eventually be 

 subject to the same conflict as between conservation interests on the one 

 hand, and economic interests on the other, that has already marked debates 

 on national resource development policies on the national level . . ." 

 According to the Canadian proposal, this conflict can only l)e averted through 

 the "elaboration and acceptance of stringent safety standards from the very 

 outset." If international law does not create a regime soon, companies may decide 

 to proceed before the law catches up with accelerating technology. This would 

 result in a "froe-for-.-ill among tlio giant corporations of the major industrialized 

 powers, with the inherent danger that resources will be wasted [and] the en- 

 vironment suffer degradation . . ." Canada suggests a transitional regulatory 

 system to avert such environmental chaos. 



According to Canada, the conflict of interest in an international seabed agency 

 can be cured only throiigh providing stringent environmental standards at the out- 



