221 



set. Certainly, these standards are much easier to establish at that time. In this 

 regard, the oceans present an unusual opportunity to soundly manage resources 

 and prevent environmental catastrophes before commercial development begins 

 and interests vest in low cost, pollutin<i operations. 



The basic thrust and structure of the U.S. proposed ISRA could be altered to 

 avert the conflict. The ISRA could be empowered to collect and monitor global 

 information on marine pollution, living and nonliving ocean resources, and other 

 oceanographic data in order to form comprehensive plans for both the conserva- 

 tion and development of ocean resources. A greater emphasis on rational resource 

 management should be made in the draft convention rather than on creating an 

 international ocean mining agency. The scope of the ISRA should be broadened 

 beyond its narrow ken of deep-sea mineral resource extraction. There are many 

 analogies in domestic U.S. law, for an enlarged ISRA balancing development 

 and conservation of resources, such as the San Francisco Bay Conservation & 

 Development Commission, the California Coastal Commission, and others. 



Unless the seabed regime is revised to eliminate the existing conflict of inter- 

 est, the international sealied agency may reflect only the commercial interests 

 purportedly regulated. It may become as institutionally insensitive to marine 

 environmental problems as the present International "S^Tialing Commission. In 

 addition to expanding its purposes, the ISRA's commissions' membership must 

 be revised to require a fair representation of the environmental viewpoint in- 

 cluding marine biologists, oceanographers. and other persons with expertise in 

 marine pollution or ocean ecological problems. 



Some provision should also be made to allow international organizations, 

 n.g.os, and entities other than sovereign states, to bring proceedings in the ISRA 

 Tribunal to review the environmental programs, policies, and impact analysis of 

 the ISRA, its commissions, and the trustee state. There is little assurance with- 

 out such enforcement that other states would act to challenge proposed licenses 

 that present significant environmental problems. The licensing authority, ISRA, 

 cannot police itself. Consequently, other international environmental organiza- 

 tions should be granted standing before the ISRA to review its decisions which 

 may have a significant impact on the environmental quality of the oceans. While 

 citizens suits in domestic law are sometimes resisted because of the millions of 

 potential plaintiffs, these dangers certainly do not exist for the limited number 

 of international environmental organizations. 



Finally, several procedures exist for reviewing the seabed regimes before they 

 are discussed at the U.X. Law of the Sea Conference. First, the United States is 

 required to file a NEPA statement on international conventions. Unlike the 

 recent Ocean Dumping Convention, the NEPA statement of President Nixon's 

 Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area of August 30, 1970 should 

 be prepared now, before the Conference, when bargaining positions are formed 

 which allegedly prejudice a thorough NEPA impact analysis of all possible alter- 

 natives. Secondly, the Sierra Club, through the New York office, should request 

 that the United Nations perform an environmental study of all seabed proposals. 

 The U.N. has already performed many "economic" studies of various kinds of 

 licensing regimes, l)ut there has been no comparable analysis of the impact of 

 these proposals on the environmental quality of the oceans. After the Stock- 

 holm Conference, the U.N. should, in addition to creating general awareness of 

 the global environment, analyze its own activities, proposals, and conferences 

 which may affect the environment. The new Secretariat for Environmental Af- 

 fairs could carry out this U.N. environmental study of the proposed seabed 

 regimes. 



In sum, the proposed U.S. convention on the international seabed area presents 

 many substantial environmental problems that have not been sufficiently an- 

 alyzed, let alone resolved, by the United Sta,tes or ofher nations. The conven- 

 tion contains vague, weak provisions concerning pollution from seabed activities?. 

 There is no requirement that the ISRA, its commissions, and trustee states 

 thoroughly analyze a seabed project before issuing an exploration or exploitation 

 license; and there is no method for other international organizations to obtain 

 judicial review before the ISRA Tribunal of the adequacy of s\ich an analysis. 

 Even if the convention were revised to incorporate stringent ecological stand- 

 ards and a required environmental impact analysis, a fundamental defect per- 

 sists. The ISRA has a built in conflict of interest in protecting the oceans' en- 

 vironmental quality when its objective is to license mineral development and 

 generate large revenues for all nations. This conflict can be averted by changing 

 the ISRA's structure, enlarging its objectives to rationally study, plan and man- 



