229 



the cut-oflf dates for application set forth in Regulation 11(2) of Annex I are 

 unduly liberal. Much earlier dates are necessary to meet the objectives set forth 

 in IMCO Assembly Resolution A.237(VII). 



The meaning of these cut-ofC dates is far from hypothetical. As a practical 

 matter, the farther off application of the standards is, the greater the likelihood 

 that the requirements will be ineffective until virtually the year 2000. A recent 

 survey by the federal Maritime Administration shows that as of January 1, 

 1973 there were 533 oil carrying vessels on order or under construction through- 

 out the world, including 276 tankers over 175,000 DVv'T ; and, that the world 

 tanker fleet contained an additional 750 tankers, including about 230 super- 

 tankers, all built within the last four years. The survey also shows that vir- 

 tually none of these tankers will incorporate double bottoms or a segregated 

 ballast capacity. It is common knowledge that a worldwide shipbuilding boom 

 is underway in order to meet skyrocketing demands for imported petroleum. 

 If the applicable dates in the Convention are put off to 1980, however, it is 

 likely that all the capacit.v needed to serve world needs in the 1980-2000 period 

 will be constructed prior to such time, and thus the entire purpose of the Con- 

 vention will be undermined. The United States must continue to advocate adop- 

 tion of the earliest possible completion dates to trigger applicability of the Con- 

 vention's design and construction standards. 



(b) The Convention must provide for mandatory enforcement of its provi- 

 sions. 



Discharge and design standards will only be effective if they are enforceable. 

 Indeed, the Convention itself is needed in part because of the failure to provide 

 for adequate enforcement mechanisms in the International Convention for 

 Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (the '-1954 Convention"). If the 

 Contracting States are given full discretion to enforce or to decline to enforce 

 the provisions of the Convention, or if they are not required to investigate alleged 

 violations, the environmental protective purposes of the Convention may be sub- 

 stantially undercut. As it now stands, much of the language contained in the 

 Fifth Draft is in the alternative, providing for either permissive or mandatory 

 enforcement of various of its provisions. We believe that it is essential that the 

 United States press for inclusion of the mandatory language and fully support 

 provisions which vest power to prohibit discharges, investigate casualties or 

 .■suspected violations and punish violators both in "flag" states and "port" or 

 "coastal" states. If such mechanisms are incorporated in the flnal version, the 

 Convention will not only be strong but will provide a significant precedent for 

 future international agreements regulating ocean usage. 



(i) Mandatory Penalty Prorisions. — Article 4 of the Convention spells out the 

 penalties and jurisdictional criteria to be applied whenever a violation of the 

 Convention occurs. This provision, in either of the two Alternatives presented 

 (Alternative I and Alternative II), provides for prohibition of discharges of 

 harmful substances in violation of the Convention under the law of the Admin- 

 istration of the offending ship (the "flag" state) and/or the law of any other 

 Contracting State when the discharge occurs mthin its "territorial seas" (the 

 "coastal" state). Leaving enforcement solely to the "flag" state, especially if 

 the flag is one of convenience, i.e., Liberia or Panama, would virtually guarantee 

 that the Convention would not be fully enforced. 



Alternative II appears preferable because it is more inclusive in scope and 

 because it defines more precisely the rights and obligations of the Contracting 

 States. Prohibition of "any violation of the requirements of the present Conven- 

 tion", the operative language in Alternative II, would appear to have a broader 

 scope than the language contained in Alternative I which would only require 

 prohibition of "any discharge of harmful substances or effluent containing these 

 substances in contravention of the provisions of the Regulations." Presumably 

 the former language provides Contracting States with the power to take action 

 with regard to violation of design and construction standards as well as the 

 actual discharge of effluents in excess of the Convention's limitations. 



To work well, enforcement must be as automatic as possible. Thus, the lan- 

 guage in Alternative II, which provides that an Administration "shall cause 

 such proceedings to be taken as soon as possible," if it is informed of a violation 

 and is satisfied that suflScient evidence is available to enable proceedings to be 

 brought, is in the interest of a strong, effective, enforceable Convention. If Con- 

 tracting States merely have an option to prosecute, then there is no assurance 

 whatsoever that the Convention will in fact be enforced. Consequently, we would 

 take strong issue with the suggestion of some delegations (set forth in Footnote 



