SCIENCE AND THE SEA 



The midwatch was uneventful, but at 0400 

 the relieving watch officer obtained a radar fix 

 which indicated that the ship was about one mile 

 seaward of the track. He, therefore, changed 

 course to 147°T to bring the ship gradually back 

 to the desired track line. Shortly thereafter 

 heavy fog set in, reducing visibility to less than 

 one mile. The master and the engineer on watch 

 were notified, and the engine was placed on 

 standby. The automatic fog signal was activated, 

 but no change in speed was made. A few minutes 

 later the master arrived on the bridge to check 

 for radar contacts, but none was observed. After 

 spending about five minutes on the bridge he went 

 below again where he remained until the collision. 

 At 0443, after another radar fix placed the vessel 

 seaward of the track line, the watch officer 

 changed course to 144°T. 



Ship B was first observed at 0447 as a radar 

 contact bearing 003' relative at a distance of 

 approximately 8 miles. At 0449 another radar fix 

 was obtained which plotted seaward of the desired 

 track, and the course was again changed to the 

 left to 139°T. At 0450 Skip B appeared on radar 

 to be about 012° relative at a distance of 6 miles. 

 The watch officer alerted his bow lookout that a 

 ship was off the starboard bow and cautioned him 

 to keep a sharp lookout. He failed, however, to 

 notify the master or to reduce speed. At 0457 the 

 watch officer again observed Ship B on the radar 

 screen and noted that the target appeared to be 

 bearing 020° relative at 2 miles before being lost in 

 the sea return. He then went out on the starboard 

 bridge wing to listen for fog signals and heard the 

 bow lookout sound the bell signal indicating a 

 vessel to starboard. At about 0458 the watch 

 officer heard one prolonged blast close aboard. 

 Moments later Ship B's port side light, masthead 

 light, and range lights suddenly appeared out of 

 the fog about 003° relative to Ship A at less than 

 1,000 yards. The watch officer ordered Hard Right 

 and put the engineroom telegraph on full astern. 

 One short blast was sounded, followed by several 

 more. Collision occurred seconds later with Ship A 

 just beginning to answer her right rudder. Ship B 

 penetrated Ship A to & distance of 40 feet on the 

 starboard side of No. 2 hold. 



SHIP B 



Ship B was enroute from La Libertad, El 

 Salvador, to San Francisco, California. On the 

 morning of the collision the ship was proceeding 

 northward along the coastal route on a course of 

 334° T at a speed of 16 knots. At 0345, when the 



ship drew abeam of Pt. Piedras Blancas Light, a 

 heavy fog set in. The master was informed of the 

 situation, and he reduced speed to 12 knots. The 

 telegraph was placed on standby, the engineroom 

 notified, fog signals started, and a lookout posted 

 on the forecastle. The course at this time was 

 334°T. 



At 0445 a target was picked up on radar 

 bearing 357° relative, range about 7 miles. The 

 contact was reported to the master who changed 

 course to 345° T. The limit of visibility at this 

 time was approximately one mile. A few minutes 

 later the target was observed at a range of 4.5 

 miles, but no bearing was obtained. At approxi- 

 mately 0455 the watch officer scanned the radar 

 screen and determined that the range was 2 miles 

 and that the bearing appeared to be opening. 

 Shortly thereafter the master assumed the conn. 



At 0458 the bow lookout sounded the bell 

 signal indicating a ship off the port bow, and the 

 master ordered Right 20° Rudder. Less than a 

 minute later Ship A appeared out of the fog, her 

 port and starboard side lights, masthead light, and 

 range lights all visible. The master immediately 

 ordered Hard Right and sounded one short blast. 

 Collision occurred seconds later as the bow of 

 Ship B tore into the starboard side of Ship A. 

 At the time of impact Ship B was still making 

 turns for 12 knots. 



ANALYSIS 



The primary cause of this collision was the 

 excessive speed at which both ships were navi- 

 gated during conditions of extremely restricted 

 visibility. Equally responsible was the failure of 

 the watch officer on each vessel to stop their 

 engines and navigate with caution after hearing, 

 apparently forward of the beam, the fog signal of 

 a vessel the position of which is not ascertained. 

 Both citations are, of course, in violation of Rule 

 16. Contributing greatly to the casualty was the 

 amazingly casual manner in which personnel of 

 both ships utilized available radar information. 



Ship A, proceeding at an unusually high rate 

 of speed, encountered heavy fog shortly after 0400. 

 Neither the master nor the watch officer felt it 

 necessary to reduce speed, presumably secure in 

 the knowledge that radar data was available. 

 Then, after detecting Ship B in such a position as 

 to indicate a meeting situation was probably 

 developing, the watch officer altered course to the 

 left for no better reason than to return to the 

 track line. However, the close-quarter situation 

 could still have been avoided if the radar had been 

 properly used, for what the watch officer saw on 



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