COLLISIONS— 1969 



to be a large, light-colored mass or cloud. Neither 

 officer was able to distinguish any navigational 

 lights, nor were any fog signals heard coming from 

 its direction. The master ordered Left Full Rudder 

 and sounded two short blasts. At 2138 the engines 

 were stopped; then backed full. Three short 

 blasts were sounded. No one on Ship B heard any 

 signals from the contact except one group of 3 

 short blasts shortly before the collision. At 2140 

 the starboard bow of Ship B made contact with 

 the port side of Ship A, amidships. At the time 

 of impact Ship B formed an angle with Ship A of 

 about 45 degrees tending aft. 



ANALYSIS 



The primary cause of this casualty was the 

 violation of Rule 16(c) by the masters of both 

 vessels. Each of these officers detected the other 

 ship in ample time to comply with Rule 16, but 

 neither took early and substantial action to avoid 

 a close quarter situation, nor did they stop their 

 engines and then navigate with caution until the 

 danger of collision was over. 



A factor which contributed greatly to the 

 casualty was the failure of personnel of both ships 

 to evaluate properly or to analyze the radar 

 information available. Neither vessel attempted 

 to maintain a graphic plot of radar data and, 

 therefore, were never fully aware of the other's 

 course and speed prior to the collision. During 

 the passage from the pilot station to Buoy 2CB, 

 Ship A had maneuvered to the right several times, 

 by the master's own admission. After each such 

 maneuver, he attempted to return to the track 

 line by steering to the left of base course. It is 

 evident that Ship A's heading was well to the 

 left of base course when the master first observed 

 Ship B on the starboard bow. It is also evident 

 that subsequent changes in Ship B's relative 

 bearing must have been the result of heading 

 changes in Ship A. Parenthetically, this situation 

 exemplifies the risk involved in using a relative 

 motion display without a clear understanding of 

 what it actually indicates. 



Ship B's radar watch left much to be desired. 

 After the initial contact, the master apparently 

 left the job up to the watch officer. The latter's 

 failure to alert the master or take action himself 

 after he observed the proximity and unchanging 

 bearing of Ship A minutes before the collision is, 

 of course, inexcusable. 



In retrospect, it appears likely that the 

 collision might have been averted had Ship B 

 elected to turn right instead of making the always 



risky turn to the left. Here again, the maintenance 

 of a plot would have provided the master with 

 some knowledge of Ship A's relative movement 

 and aided him in taking proper avoiding actions. 

 There was some evidence that Ship B was 

 exhibiting lights which could have been, and 

 probably were, mistaken for prescribed navigation 

 lights. 



CASE 4 



The principals in this case were two American 

 ships that collided in the vicinity of West Penob- 

 scot Bay, Maine, during a period of dense fog. A 

 light breeze was blowing from the south and there 

 was a slight southerly sea running at the time of 

 the casualty. The tide was flooding with high 

 water at Monhegan Island scheduled at 2038. 



NARRATIVE 

 SHIP A 



Ship A, enroute to Linden, New Jersey, 

 departed Buckport, Maine, at 1420. The vessel 

 proceeded down the Penobscot River and entered 

 West Penobscot Bay using various courses and 

 speeds under the direction of a pilot. At approxi- 

 mately 1724 the engineroom was placed on standby 

 and the ship's engine speed reduced to half-ahead 

 due to fog closing in. The vessel commenced 

 sounding fog signals, and a lookout was stationed 

 in the bow. 



With the master on the bridge, the vessel 

 continued at half-ahead (about 9 knots) on a 

 course of 180° T down West Penobscot Bay, 

 stemming the flood tidal current. At 1748 a radar 

 bearing indicated that Two Bush Island Lighted 

 Whistle Buoy TBI was abeam approximately V2 

 mile to port. The course was altered to 240°T in 

 order to enter Two Bush Channel. A short time 

 after steadying on this course a large target was 

 noted on the radar screen about seven or eight 

 miles ahead. The master and pilot together esti- 

 mated that the target was on a generally northeast 

 course heading toward Two Bush Channel and that 

 it was a few degrees on the starboard bow of 

 Ship A. 



At approximately 1753 the pilot changed 

 course to 235 "T intending to make a starboard- to- 

 starboard passing with the approaching vessel and 

 to leave Two Bush Ledge Lighted Gong Buoy to 

 starboard. Sometime later the course was altered 

 to 230°T in order to leave still more room for the 

 intended starboard-to-starboard passing. At 1812 

 a fog signal was heard from the approaching 

 vessel, and the pilot stopped the engine. The 



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