SCIENCE AND THE SEA 



entirely by radar and by use of the fathometer. 

 All fixes obtained were the result of radar ranges 

 and bearings. At 1719 the vessel was fixed abeam 

 of Burnt Island Lookout Tower at a distance off 

 of approximately 3,500 yards. The vessel continued 

 ahead at maneuvering speed. 



After passing the Burnt Island landmark the 

 fog became more dense over larger areas. At 1741 

 the vessel was abeam of Marshall Point Lighted 

 Whistle Buoy i at a distance off of approximately 

 800 yards. At 1804, when almost abeam of Tenants 

 Harbor Lighted Bell Buoy 1, the master altered 

 the ship's course to 079°T so as to enter Two 

 Bush Channel. 



At 1811 the radar revealed a target ahead 

 which the master initially evaluated as being a 

 large ship at anchor in the lower reaches of West 

 Penobscot Bay. He thereupon reduced the engine 

 speed to half-ahead and a minute later further 

 reduced engine speed to slow-ahead. At 1814 the 

 master heard the fog signal of an approaching 

 vessel. Finally realizing that the ship observed 

 on radar was in fact underway, he stopped the 

 engines. At this time the two vessels were about 

 IV^ miles apart. 



Closely watching the other ship's movements 

 on the radar screen Ship B's master automatically 

 decided on a port-to-port passing and attempted 

 to shape his course accordingly. Observing that 

 the downbound ship bore steadily to the right, he 

 made rapid, successive course changes to the right 

 finally steadying on 145° T. At 1818, aware of the 

 proximity of the approaching vessel and that his 

 ship was headed toward shoal water, the master 

 ordered full astern and sounded three short blasts 

 on the ship's whistle. Shortly thereafter three 

 short blasts were heard from the approaching 

 vessel at close range. 



At 1820 the bow of Ship A was visually 

 observed as it loomed out of the mist about 100 

 yards to port. Convinced that a colHsion was now 

 imminent, the master ordered full ahead and full 

 left rudder in an attempt to lessen the impact. At 

 1821 the bow of Ship A struck Ship B, cutting 

 deeply into the port side of number 2 hold. 



ANALYSIS 



The primary cause of this casualty was simply 

 that both ships were operated without due caution 

 and at immoderate speeds in restricted waters 

 during a period of extremely low visibility. Each 

 ship was in Inland Waters and was, therefore, 

 bound by Article 16 of the Inland Rules. Neither 

 ship, however, could be said to have been fulfilling 



the intent and purpose of that article. 



Ship A detected Ship B by radar approxi- 

 mately 30 minutes before the unfortunate encoun- 

 ter, but no change in speed was effected as a result. 

 Upon hearing the fog signals of Ship B nine 

 minutes before the casualty. Ship A stopped her 

 engine in accordance with accepted practice and 

 Article 16. Two minutes later. Ship A went half- 

 speed on her engine. This action was taken just 

 seven minutes and approximately 1 mile from the 

 scene of the collision, at a time when some drastic 

 collision avoidance action was obviously necessary. 

 True, it had been determined by radar that 

 Ship B's bearing was opening progressively to the 

 right. However, Recommendation 3 in the Annex 

 to the International Rules, Recommendations on 

 the Use of Radar Information as an aid to avoiding 

 Collisions at Sea, which, it would seem, are 

 applicable to the use of radar in any circumstance, 

 states. When navigating in restricted visibility, the 

 radar range and bearing alone do not constitute 

 ascertainment of the position of the other vessel 

 under Rule 16(b) sufficiently to relieve a vessel of 

 the duty to stop her engines and navigate with 

 caution when a fog signal is heard forward of the 

 beam. 



Even after Ship B's bearing ceased to open, 

 five minutes and less than a mile before the fateful 

 meeting, the only action taken by Ship A was to 

 stop her engine. Ship A 's emergency full astern 

 order 2 minutes before the collision was given too 

 late to counter the way of a large ship. 



Ship B encountered dense fog shortly after 

 entering inland waters yet continued toward the 

 narrow waters of Two Bush Channel with no 

 reduction in speed. Ten minutes before reaching 

 the collision site. Ship B's engine speed was 

 reduced and a few minutes later stopped when it 

 was realized that Ship A was underway. No 

 radar plot was maintained on Ship B, a device 

 which might have revealed Ship A 's intentions in 

 time to prevent Ship B's radical course changes 

 to the right. As in the case of Ship A, Ship B did 

 not attempt to negate the way until too late. 



Ship A's decision to attempt the unconven- 

 tional starboard-to-starboard passing during a 

 period of poor visibility and without a passing 

 agreement was an exercise in poor judgement. 



Finally, both ships violated Article 18, Rule IX, 

 in sounding the three blast whistle signals to 

 indicate full astern, for neither vessel was in sight 

 of the other at the time. 



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