COLLISIONS— 1969 



CONCLUSION 



The majority of mariners will undoubtedly 

 agree that the risk of collision increases with speed 

 and reduction of range; that close-quarter situa- 

 tions are dangerous and at high speed, an invitation 

 to disaster; and that all of these risks are com- 

 pounded by factors which tend to limit visibility 

 and the sources of information. Well acquainted 

 as they are with these truisms, mariners continue 

 to be plagued by a high incidence of collision that, 

 annually, accounts for serious loss of life and 

 costly property damage. 



Other than the Rules of the Road, there is no 

 panacea for the prevention of collisions. Even the 

 Rules, although meticulously forged to cover every 

 possible situation, will not prove effective if they 

 are carelessly applied or wilfully ignored. Fortu- 

 nately, all Rule violations don't necessarily result 

 in collision, but very few instances have been 

 recorded in which a collision was not the result of 

 some Rule violation. Obviously, successful collision 

 avoidance depends, in no small way, upon a strict 

 adherence to the Rules of the Road by all parties 

 concerned. 



In the foregoing cases the prevalent cause of 

 each collision was the violation of Rule 16 (Article 

 16 of the Inland Rules in Case 4). This rule is, to 

 an extent, an interpretive one in that it permits 

 the shiphandler a certain latitude in determining 

 speed and/or disengaging maneuvers. To prevent 

 possible misinterpretations, however, the Inter- 

 national Rules of the Road include an Annex to 

 the Rules which helps to explain the somewhat 

 vague phrasing of Rule 16 for radar-equipped 

 vessels. 



Under Rule 16(a), for example, a ship in 

 restricted visibility shall go at a moderate speed 

 and have careful regard to the existing circum- 

 stances and conditions. The precise value of what 

 constitutes moderate speed is not given for the 

 simple reason that it will vary with the situation. 

 Paragraph 2 of the forementioned Annex to the 

 Rules states that Rule 16(a) applies to radar- 

 equipped vessels and further indicates that the 

 vessels so equipped use their radar information in 

 determining moderate speed. It is only reasonable 

 to expect, therefore, that personnel of radar- 

 equipped ships would interpret the meaning of the 

 word moderate in a somewhat different sense 

 than those in a ship without radar. In the final 

 analysis, the same responsibilities exist, and it 

 must be borne in mind that any speed which con- 

 tributes to a collision will be deemed immoderate 

 by the courts. 



According to the Annex, radar-equipped 

 ships are not exempt from the requirements of 

 Rule 16(b) simply because they hold radar contact 

 with the vessel under advisement. All ships must 

 stop their engines and navigate with caution until 

 danger of collision is over. Radar or not, this is 

 sound advice, for in most cases when a fast moving 

 ship hears the fog signal of another, she is probably 

 already too close for safety. 



Rule 16(c) permits and encourages ships to 

 take early and substantial action to avoid a close- 

 quarters situation when they detect the presence 

 of another vessel forward of the beam. Detection, 

 in this rule, obviously means radar detection, and 

 radar navigators should pay particular attention 

 to the alternatives offered. The determination of 

 when is early and what is substantial rests with 

 the mariner and depends upon the circumstances 

 of the case. Certainly, any action taken by either 

 of two ships with a relative closing speed of 36 

 knots (as in Case 1) should occur before they are 

 only seven or eight miles apart. On the other hand, 

 a small change of course, even at considerable 

 range, is not to be considered as substantial action. 



The point in Rule 16(c) that seems to have 

 been missed by all of the ships is that if a close- 

 quarters situation cannot be avoided by early 

 action the vessel shall stop her engines in proper 

 time to avoid collision and then navigate with 

 caution until danger of collision is over. 



There is nothing in either the Rules or its 

 Annex, of course, which can regulate the efficiency 

 with which radar is used. This is a matter of 

 individual proficiency, the same as being a good 

 or poor helmsman. There is little excuse for a 

 mariner obtaining an incorrect value of bearing 

 and distance by radar observation, whether it be a 

 true-motion or relative-motion observation. Such 

 inept usage of radar can lead him down the 

 primrose path and place him in a position where 

 good fortune, rather than skill, becomes the prime 

 factor in whether or not a collision will occur. 

 Skillful interpretation of the radar picture and a 

 full appreciation of the developing situation are 

 essential if behavior is to be based on the use of 

 radar. 



It is well known that the maintenance of a 

 graphic plot is essential to intelligent radar usage. 

 Without assistance, however, a watch officer of a 

 merchant ship may be unable to plot contacts 

 continually due to the pressure of other duties. 

 In this case a simple timed record of ranges, 

 bearings, and course changes should be kept. But 

 if the risk of collision truly exists, a watch officer 



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