Ch. 7— Federal Programs for Collecting and Managing Oceanographic Data • 271 



with a Sea Beam system) and the Davidson (equipped 

 with BS^) and announced long-range plans to sys- 

 tematically map the U.S. EEZ. NOAA's plans for 

 comprehensively mapping the EEZ at a high reso- 

 lution — depth contours of 10-20 meters, and geo- 

 detic precision of 50-100 meters — have been chal- 

 lenged by the Navy, and the two agencies have 

 since entered into protracted negotiations in search 

 of a workable solution, but in the summer of 1987 

 significant problems remained unresolved.*^ 



Marine scientists and private commercial inter- 

 ests are concerned that the Navy may classify 

 NOAA bathymetric and geophysical data. When- 

 ever data classification is at issue, the reasons for 

 the security restrictions themselves are considered 

 sensitive, thus opportunities are limited for public 

 review of the need and extent of restrictions or for 

 consultation to identify possible compromises to bal- 

 Eince security risks and scientific needs. In general, 

 both the oceanographic community and private in- 

 dustry have not been involved in the negotiations 

 between NOAA and the Navy to the degree that 

 the non-government interests believe they should 

 be, given their stake in the outcome of the classifi- 

 cation decision. Even some scientists within NOAA 

 feel alienated from the process. 



Earlier Reviews of Data Classification 



In 1985, the Director of the White House Of- 

 fice of Science and Technology Policy requested 

 that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) re- 

 view the National Security Council's position that 

 public availability of broad-coverage, high-resolu- 

 tion bathymetric and geophysical maps of the EEZ 

 would pose a threat to national security; NAS was 

 asked to explore plausible means to balance national 

 security concerns with the needs of the academic 

 and industrial communities. In the course of its 

 study, the NAS Naval Studies Board found it im- 

 possible to "quantify" national security benefits 

 gained from classification or the possible benefits 

 that could be realized by the U.S. scientific and in- 

 dustrial users if such data were to be freely avail- 

 able to the public. 



Because of the difficulty it encountered in evalu- 

 ating the benefits and risks associated with classify- 

 ing bathymetric and geophysical data, the Naval 

 Studies Board restricted its inquiry to whether the 

 unrestricted release of accurately positioned, high- 

 resolution bathymetric data could result in any new 

 and significant tactical or strategic military threats. 

 It did not assess the needs of the oceanographic and 

 geophysical research community for the data, nor 

 did it assess the ocean mining industry's need for 

 such surveys. The Naval Studies Board concluded 

 that "map matching," i.e., locating one's position 

 by matching identifiable features on the seafloor 

 by using precise bathymetry from broad regional 

 coverage, could afford potentially hostile forces a 

 unique and valuable tool for positioning subma- 

 rines within the U.S. EEZ. 



While the Naval Studies Board supported the 

 Navy's position with regard to classifying and con- 

 trolling "processed" survey data, it did not favor 

 classifying raw data until they are processed into 

 a form that provides full geodetic precision and 

 large area coverage. As a further measure, the 

 Board suggested that each processed map be re- 

 viewed for distinctive navigational features that 

 would make it valuable for precise positioning and 

 that the sensitive data be "filtered" as necessary 

 to permit its use in unclassified maps. The Board 

 further recommended that the sensitive data be 

 made available on a classified basis to authorized 

 users and that raw data covering a limited area be 

 released without security restrictions for the pur- 

 suit of legitimate research.*^ 



A second review of the Navy's data classifica- 

 tion policy regarding multi-beam data was also un- 

 dertaken by the National Advisory Committee on 

 Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) at the request 

 of NOAA in 1985. NACOA generally supported 

 the Naval Studies Board's conclusions, and found 

 the national security argument for classifying high- 

 resolution bathymetric data made by the Navy 

 more "compelling" than the counterargument 

 made by the academic community for free exchange 

 of scientific information.^" NACOA therefore rec- 



'^Letter from Anthony J. Calio, Administrator, NOAA, to Rear 

 Admiral John R. Seesholtz, Oceanographer of the Navy, Feb. 3, 1986; 

 and reply from Seesholtz to Calio, Mar. 14, 1986. An extensive ex- 

 change of correspondence followed between Calio and Seesholtz 

 through Nov. 6, 1986. 



"Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of U.S. Ex- 

 clusive Economic Zone Survey Data, (Washington, DC: National Re- 

 search Council, Mar. 25, 1985), p. 6. 



^''National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, 

 NACOA Statement on the Classification of Multibeam Bathymetric 

 Data (Washington, DC: National Advisory Committee on Oceans 

 and Atmosphere, Jan. 17, 1986), p. 4. 



