recently completed the preparation of a Federal 

 plan for Marine Meteorology coordinating the 

 activities of all participating Federal agencies. 



The Office of the Federal Coordinator has the 

 responsibility for the coordination of meteoro- 

 logical programs only. It has no directive authority 

 over governmental agencies. It has been able to 

 effect a policy of sharing facilities and, in some 

 cases, has been able to forestall the establishment 

 of duplicate facilities. 



In addition, the Interdepartmental Committee 

 for the Atmospheric Sciences coordinates "basic" 

 research in meteorology, reporting to the Federal 

 Council for Science and Technology. 



III. ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS' 



A viable marine monitoring and prediction 

 system depends both scientifically and techno- 

 logically on close integration with the corre- 

 sponding meteorological system. Operational costs 

 can be significantly reduced when common plat- 

 forms are used for observing both elements of the 

 environment. The same argument applies to the 

 use of communications links, data processing, and 

 dissemination systems. Therefore, the marine en- 

 vironmental monitoring and prediction system for 

 both ocean and atmosphere should be planned and 

 operated to the extent possible as a single system. 



Of the organizational options identified by the 

 panel for the expanded environmental monitoring 

 and prediction program, the first two would con- 

 tinue present agency responsibilities, (1) including 

 appropriate interagency coordination or (2) as- 

 signing coordination responsibility to a lead 

 agency. 



Either of these options would continue the 

 present fragmentation of effort with attendant 

 management and funding difficulties. Neither a 

 coordinating committee nor the lead agency con- 

 cept has proved fully effective. Experience to date 

 has indicated that the coordinating conmiittees 

 serve as forums for the discussion of the programs 

 of the individual agencies, which each agency 

 funds. Agreements reached in committee, assign- 

 ing individual agency responsibilities, can founder 

 due to inadequate funding in any of the participat- 

 ing agencies. 



The various options are intended to provide for the 

 conduct of operational activities and supporting research, 

 but not for basic research. 



The principal value of interagency coordinating 

 committees in the past has been the exchange of 

 information describing agency programs. Such 

 committees can only have an indirect effect on 

 agency budgets, and thus they tend to be ineffec- 

 tive in "moving" an agreed-upon-multi-agency 

 program. In some cases, where it was advantageous 

 to all agencies involved, it has been possible to 

 eliminate dupUcation. This has been particularly 

 true when the dupHcation was in regard to the 

 planned establishment of new facilities. 



The lead agency concept has not proved effec- 

 tive in advancing National program objectives. The 

 lead agency has tended to be the agency with the 

 responsibility, but often without the budget to 

 carry out its responsibility. Recent experience, 

 supported by testimony of witnesses before the 

 panel, indicates that the citation of the lead 

 agency responsibility as a funding argument has 

 not been very successful. 



(3) Conduct of the entire program by the 

 Department of Defense is an option which might 

 result in civil requirements being placed after 

 military requirements. The miUtary chain-of- 

 command tends to operate in such a fashion that 

 military commanders must be satisfied; this may 

 be expected to cause delays or priority reductions 

 in purely civil aspects of the program when 

 conflicts occur for application of relatively scarce 

 resources. 



Military security considerations may tend to 

 hinder development of the civil portion of the 

 program. It is usually easier to classify an entire 

 program than to carefully examine it to determine 

 the activities that can be unclassified (or declassi- 

 fied) and those that are genuinely critical. 



As a result, orderly development of the environ- 

 mental monitoring and prediction program by the 

 full participation of the scientific community may 

 be restricted if some aspect of the program causes 

 significant portions to be over-classified. 



In some countries the military has the responsi- 

 bility for all national environmental programs 

 (Italy is an example); in such cases civil require- 

 ments do not usually receive required priority, and 

 representation at international functions is 

 hampered. In other countries (England and Canada 

 are examples) a civil agency provides environ- 

 mental services to the defense establishment. 



The scale of the Defense Department budget 

 would probably make funding of the environmen- 



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