The foregoing "spatial conflict" situations con- 

 tain a distinction relevant to the accommodation 

 problem: traffic density involves conflict between 

 like users of the same ocean space for the same 

 type of use. The shipping and shelf installation 

 problem involves conflict between different types 

 of users of the same ocean space. 



A solution to spatial conflict is to designate sea 

 lanes. The idea of marine traffic lanes is over a 

 century old, but as yet has only limited adoption. 

 The current North Atlantic Track Agreement 

 involves only 16 shipping companies flying six 

 different flags. The use of these lanes by the 

 Andrea Dona and the Stockholm undoubtedly 

 would have prevented their collision. 



Separate upbound and downbound courses for 

 ships belonging to the Lake Carriers Association 

 were adopted for Lakes Superior and Huron in 

 1911 and have since been extended to Lake 

 Michigan (1926), Lake Erie (1947), and Lake 

 Ontario (1949). These lanes have proved very 

 effective. 



Presently, sea lanes constitute two categories: 

 traffic separation lanes for vessels and fairways 

 through Continental Shelf installations. 



Separation lanes established by the Coast Guard 

 consist of two-way shipping lanes leading to 



harbor entrances, with inward and outward traffic 

 separated by a safety buffer zone similar to the 

 dividing strip on highways. 



Fairways through Continental Shelf installa- 

 tions make use of the Corps of Engineers authority 

 under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 

 (1953) to grant permits for offshore structures. 

 Fairways are sea lanes that the Corps, after 

 consultation with the shipping and oil industry, 

 has agreed to keep free of fixed oil or other 

 installations. Such fairways are not mandatory and 

 may be changed. They presently exist only in the 

 Gulf and while providing a partial solution to the 

 problem of cargo carriers attempting to reach port, 

 they do not solve the fishermen's difficulties. 



Structural standards for offshore platforms 

 have been self-imposed by industry. Experience 

 gained in recent hurricanes indicates that the 

 predicted severity of conditions was less than 

 actually encountered, and many underdesigned 

 structures failed. Their dismembered portions ht- 

 ter a considerable area of the seabed. 



Although industry is obligated to remove such 

 wreckage located on drilling sites, debris that has 

 settled elsewhere remains. The larger pieces are 

 menaces to surface navigation and vessels have 

 been damaged or sunk by them. At the least, they 



Figure 12. U.S. Coast Guard sea lanes for vessel traffic control 



10-26 



