ress of the war moved closer to Japan and there was increased demand for 

 fuel by our bombers and naval units. As there were limited petroleum 

 storage facilities in the Pacific, some fifty American tankers were assigned 

 to serve as floating fuel depots. Old and slow tankers were allocated to this 

 job, while faster tankers were free to engage in the task of transporting 

 the oil across the Pacific from the West Coast and other production cen- 

 ters. The fast tankers, in many cases, would transfer their cargo to the 

 storage tankers and thus make quicker turn-arounds by eliminating the 

 time formerly spent in waiting to make contact with naval vessels. 



The storage tankers were fitted out with extra discharge connections so 

 that they could fuel five or six ships at one time. About half of the tankers 

 so employed were vessels that were technically obsolete, but were quite 

 satisfactory for t|jis purpose. The remainder of the fleet consisted of seven- 

 teen Liberty ships converted as tankers, and eight former Axis tankers 

 seized in American ports. 



Admiral Nimitz has stated: "I particularly desire to acknowledge the 

 services of the commercial tankers engaged in transporting fuels to the 

 Fleet. Our requirements were numbered in millions of barrels to be trans- 

 ported thousands of miles to the scene of the Fleet operations. The volume 

 involved demanded the utmost in operations management to assure a rate 

 of delivery in keeping with our needs. Our success in keeping the Fleet 

 properly fueled was dependent upon the deliveries by these commercial 

 ships. Not once did they fail." 



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