INTRODUCTION 



BY CHESTER W. NIMITZ 



Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations 



FROM the start of our offensive movement in the Pacific in the summer of 

 1942 to the surrender of Japan three years later, the never ending plea of 

 our armed forces was for the "beans," "bullets" and "avgas," so essential for the 

 success of their missions. The thin trickle of those supplies which could be fur- 

 nished in answer to the first anguished appeals of our embattled Marines on 

 Guadalcanal grew in volume and adequacy as the war progressed, in direct pro- 

 portion to the increasing size and capability of our Merchant Marine. 



Not one of us who fought in the late war can forget — nor should any citizen 

 be allowed to forget — that the national resource which enabled us to carry the 

 war to the enemy and fight in his territory and not our own was our Merchant 

 Marine. The fighting fleets and Marines of our Navy, the ground forces of our 

 Army, and the aircraft of both would have been helpless to pound the enemy into 

 defeat overseas, had it not been for the steady stream of personnel, equipment and 

 supplies of every character brought into the rear of the combat areas, and often 

 directly into those areas, by the ships of our own Merchant Marine and those of 

 our allies. 



Twice in our history have we prevented a possible invasion of our shores by the 

 ability and capability of our armed forces to wage offensive and containing ac- 

 tions "against the enemy overseas. While we cannot discount the changes which 



