70 COUNTER-CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 



Ibid., p. 295. ]y[r^ Blaine answered on the 14th April, 1801, proposing 

 Ibid., p. 305. Question 5 in its present form, and Sir J. Pauncefote 

 assented in a Memorandum, dated the 3rd June, 1891. 



The correspondence on the modus vivendi affords further 



evidence of the limits of the claim made by the United 



States. 



Ibid., p. 307. On the 4th June, 1891, Mr. Wharton, Acting Secretary 



for the United States, wrote to Sir J. Pauncefote, 



80 with reference to Lord Salisbury's requirement that 



Russia should concur in the modus vivendi^ as follows : 



THE CONTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS HA.S BEEN LIMITED TO 

 BEHRING SEA EASTWARD OF THE LINE Oli' DEMARCATION IN THE 

 TREATY OF 1867. 



I am also directed to remind you that the contention between the 

 United States and Great Britain has been limited to that part of 

 Behring Sea eastward of the line of demarcation described in our 

 Convention with Russia. ... It was never supposed by any one 

 representing the Government of the United States in this corres])ond- 

 ence, or by the President, that the agreement for a modus vivendi should 

 be broader than tlie subject of contention stated in the correspondence 

 of the respective Governments. 



United States And on the 9tli June, 1891, Mr. Wharton wrote thus to 

 vohl.t^'ai^s!'^'''' Sir J. Pauncefote as to another provision of the modus 

 vivendi : 



As to third clause of your proposition, I am directed to say that the 

 contention between the United States and Great Britain has relation 

 solely to the respective rights of the two Governments in the waters 

 of Behring Sea outside of the ordinary territorial limits, and the stip- 

 ulations for the co-operation of the two Governments during this 

 season have, of course, the same natural limitation. 



Subject to the above protest, the grounds on which this 

 claim to protective jurisdiction is made will now be con- 

 sidered. 



FOUR GROUNDS OF CLAIM. 



They are four, viz., the established principles of the 

 common and civil law, the practice of nations, the laws of 

 natural history, and the common interests of mankind. 



" COMMON AND CIVIL LAW." MEANING OF TERMS. 



In what sense the terms "common and civil law" are 

 here used, is not very clear. The expression "common 

 law " is technical, and is well understood by the lawyers of 

 the United States and Great Britain; but it has no appli- 

 cation to the question now under discussion, excej)t in so 

 far as any general principles can be deduced therefrom. 

 " Civil law" is an exi)ression sometimes used with reference 

 to " Roman law," and sometimes in opi)osition to the 

 expression " criminal law." It is probably intended to be 

 ti^s^mustbedc-used in the latter sense, but in neither case has it any 



ter^-JtT naf "^law" ^1^1^^^^^*^^^ here. The rights of nations must be deter- 

 of wbicb the mined by the principles of international law. The "jirac- 

 tions "*^''is "jVe're ^^^^ ^^ uatious" is Only important as evidence of that law, 

 evidence. thus bringing the claim once more to the same test. 



