COUNTER-CASE OP GREAT BRITAIN. 73 



In all these creatures, reclaimed from the wildness of their nature, Ibid., p. 398. 

 the property is not absolute, but defeasible; a property, that may be 

 destroyed if they resume tbeir ancient wildness, and are found at large. 



# * # * * 



A qualified property may also subsist with relation to animals ferce. rbid., p. 399. 

 naturce, ratione iwpotentia', on account of their own inability. As, 

 when hawks, herons, or other birds build in my trees, or rabbits or 

 other creatures make their nests or burrows in my land, and have 

 young ones there; I have a qualified property in those young ones till 

 such time as they can fly or run away, and tlien my property expires. ;g^ent's "Com- 



Andmals ferie naiiiva; so loug as they are reclaimed by the art and nientaries, " uth 

 power of man, are also the subject of a qualified property ; but Avhen editiou, Boston, 

 they are abantioned, or escape, aud return to their natural liberty and|^^^' ^o'- "> P- 

 ferocity, without the animus revertcndi , the property in them ceases. "" 

 While this qualified property continues, it is as iruich under protection 

 of law as any other property, and every invasion of it is redressed in 

 the same niauuer. 



The dithciilty in ascertaining with precision the application of the 

 law arises from the want of some certain determinate standard or 

 rule, by which to determine when an animal is ferce vcl domitm vatiirce. 



If an animal belongs to the class of tame animals, as, for instance, 

 to the class of horses, sheep, or cattle, he is then clearly a subject of 

 absolute property; but if he belongs to the class of animals which 

 are wild by nature, and owe all their temporary docility to the disci- 

 pline of man, such as deer, fish, and several kind of fowl, then the 

 animal is the subject of qualified property, aud which continues so 

 long only as the tameness and dominion remain. 



NO SUGGESTION IN UNITED STATES CASE THAT, EVEN IN 

 THEIR OWN LAW, THE RULE IS NOT AS LAID DOWN BY 

 KENT. 



It would seem useless to multiply autliorities, as 

 84 there is no suggestion throughout the United States 

 Case that, even in their own law, the rule is not as 

 laid down by Kent. 



APART FROM THE QUESTION OF PROPERTY IN SEALS, 

 NO TITLE TO THEM IS SHOWN. — 'J HE UNITED STATES 

 LAWS ONLY RESERVE THE ISLANDS FOR THE GOVERN- 

 MENT. 



But independently of the question whether fur-seals at 

 large in Behring Sea can be the subjects of property at all, 

 no title to them is shown. The laws of the United States 

 set out in the Appendix to their Case in no way support 

 the view that the Government have any property in fur- United states 

 seals. By tlie Law of the 3d March, 18G9, called "A Eeso- ^^fX p.'a^^'"^'^' 

 lution more efHciently to protect the fur-seal in Alaska," it 

 was resolved — 



that the islands of St. Paul and St. George in Alaska be, and they are 

 hereby, declared a special reservation for Government purposes. 



THE LEASING POWER ONLY AUTHORIZES A LEASE OF 

 THE RIGHT TO TAKE FUR-SEALS ON THE ISLANDS, 

 AND SEND VESSELS THERE FOR 'THE SKINS. 



It is to be noted that nothing is said in this Eesolution 

 about Behring Sea, or the fur-seals therein. Similarly the 

 Law of the 1st July, 1870, called "An Act to prevent the iwd., p.93. 

 Extermination of Fur-bearing Animals in Alaska" (section 

 4), authorizes a lease of — 



the right to engage in the business of taking fur-seals on the Islands 

 of St. Paul and St. George, aud to send a vessel or vessels to said 

 islands for the skins of such seals. 



