Federal agencies operate under a variety 
of laws for the most part passed independ- 
ently of one another. Because [the Act] 
does not supersede or modify existing 
legislation or affect other congressional or 
executive mandates, Federal agency activ- 
ities will not always be consistent with 
State management programs. For instance, 
the Corps of Engineers could not comply 
with State coastal zone management regu- 
lations that are contrary to or less restric- 
tive than Corps policies and regulations 
based on other Federal legislation.” 
On the other hand, as pointed out by GAO, some 
States are counting on firm and _ straightforward 
administration of the consistency provisions. They 
are wary of the discretionary power of the Secretary 
of Commerce to overrule a State’s finding of incon- 
sistency on the basis of review of fact and substantial 
compliance or through the exception for purposes of 
national security. According to GAO,” 
“States could oppose such a determination 
by taking legal action through the courts. 
This would result in additional delays. 
States could express their opposition by 
withdrawing from the Coastal Zone Man- 
agement Program.” 
Coastal Energy Impact Program 
Over two-thirds of the Nation’s remaining oi! and 
natural gas supply is on the Outer Continental Shelf 
and_in. Alaska. As a result of the Arab oil embargo 
of 1973, accelerated development of these reserves 
has been proposed as a means to reduce U.S. de- 
pendence on imported oil and gas. Most of the 
potential offshore reserves are in previously unex- 
plored areas of the Atlantic and Alaska Coasts 
(frontier areas). 
Administration proposals in 1974 to lease 10 
million acres in the OCS (equivalent to the total 
acreage leased since Federal leasing began in the 
OCS in 1953) met State opposition. Questions were 
also immediately raised about the practicality of the 
plan from the standpoint of industry capacity. This 
lead to a coastal governor’s meeting in Washington, 
D.C., in the fall of 1974, which was addressed by 
President Ford in an effort to quell the opposition. 
The 10-million-acre target was modified in 1975. 
The States were concerned with the prospect of 
drilling off their coast for two poet reasons. 
First, the federal! OCS leasing 
States limaited opportunity to participate in the ee 
ing sia omy to parse es 
Second, coastat-Stateswould have to accommodate 
the Honesiale SUREOT facilities and provide services 
55 Ibid., p. 77. 
for the employees and families of industries asso- 
ciated with the~offshore—operations—while all of 
the royalty payments went to the Federal Govern- 
ment. 
Sparring between the States and the Department 
of the Interior over the anticipated impacts of off- 
shore oil and gas development led to proposals to 
compensate the affected States or otherwise amelio- 
rate plan for means to accommodate the impacts 
from OCS development. The proposals, some of 
which included compensation for any impact asso- 
ciated with any energy facility, whether OCS-related 
or not, included grants, ioans, and direct sharing of 
revenues from OCS leasing. 
Energy planners were concerned that recalcitrant 
State or local governments could block or severely 
limit the expansion of OCS oil and gas production. 
State control of the continental shelf in the territorial 
sea seaward to 3 nautical miles (further in the Gulf 
of Mexico), and the State police power over onshore 
siting of facilities and pipeline corridors could frus- 
trate Federal development of the OCS indirectly 
through the denial of permits or through zoning 
actions. Thus, the impetus for the Coastal Energy 
Impact Program was as much to reduce potential 
Opposition to offshore drilling and production as it 
was to provide fiscal relief for possible adverse im- 
pacts.°° 
Two congressional studies, one released immedi- 
ately before enactment of the CZMA amendments 
and the second completed at the time of enactment, 
reached essentially the same conclusions: Except for 
certain cases in the frontier areas, e.g., small, iso- 
lated areas such as Yakutat, Alaska, which is ad- 
jacent to attractive lease sale areas in the Gulf of 
Alaska, there_will likely be little significant perma- 
nent disruption of the socio-economic structure_of 
coastal regions as a consequence of offshore oil and 
gas_ development.” The problem to the extent that 
it existed, was found to-be-shert-term—a matter of 
revenue collection not_ matching early_expenditures. 
The debate concerning energy impact aid to the 
States centered not on whether such aid should be 
provided by the Federal Government, but in what 
form. The “developed” States, particularly Louisiana, 
56 See eallomtnn between Senators Harry Bellmon (R-Okla- 
hon i) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) in U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Congressional Record, Washington, D.C., Government Printing 
Office, July 17, 1976, p. 12816. 
7 The first study, made by the Congressional Research Service 
of the Library of Congress, was released in March 1976, U.S. 
Congress, House Ad Hoc Select Committee on Outer Continental 
Shelf. Effects of Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Development on 
the Coastal Zone. 94th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C., Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1976; the second study, compiled by 
the Office of Technology Assessment, was released after action 
on the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976 
was completed. U.S. Congress, Office of Technclogy Assess- 
ment, Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Systems. Washington, 
D.C., Government Printing Office, 1976. 
TV-17 
