State and local policies, and can consider various 
alternative sites for energy facilities. On the other 
hand, this very breadth of concerns can be a weak- 
ness when it comes to settling difficult energy siting 
questions. 
2. Federal-State coordination. The amendments 
make two changes in this area. Section 306(c)(8), 
which requires that no plan be approved that does 
not provide for “adequate consideration of the na- 
tional interest,” is now expanded to treat energy 
facilities more explicitly. Now before approving a 
program, the Secretary of Commerce shall find that: 
“(8) The management program provides 
for adequate consideration of the national 
interest involved in planning for, and in 
the siting of, facilities (including energy 
facilities, in, or which significantly affect, 
such state’s coastal zone) which are neces- 
sary to meet requirements which are other 
than local in nature. In the case of such 
energy facilities, the Secretary shall find 
that the State has given such consideration 
to any applicable interstate plan or pro- 
gram.” 
Second, section 307, the ‘Federal consistency” 
provision, is amended to require that oil company 
plans submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for 
any exploration, development, or production on the 
Federal OCS be consistent with a State’s approved 
coastal management program. 
Several premises appear to be behind this ap- 
proach to Federal-State coordination. One is that 
there is an implicit trade here between Federal and 
State agencies, and that making this trade will im- 
prove cooperation between the two levels of govern- 
ment. The trade is that in exchange for the State 
“adequately” considering the “national interest,” the 
Secretary of Commerce will approve the State Coastal 
Program and other Federai agencies will abide by its 
guidelines. The crucial role of local governments in 
this process adds a complicating factor. 
The unresolved question, of course, is whether 
the coastal zone management approach will work— 
whether it will improve coordination and planning, 
and whether this, if it occurs, will lead to “better” 
decisions and resolve political differences in a timely 
and constructive way. As time passes, one way to 
evaluate the success or failure of the coastal zone 
management approach will be to see how it succeeds 
in dealing with particular facility siting issues. 
The California Lawsuit 
A recent lawsuit in California has become a test 
of what coastal zone management will be in practice, 
and particularly what its role will be in the siting 
of energy facilities. It also illustrates some of the 
confusion and difficulties that accompany an actual 
effort to put a “newer” style energy-siting process 
into operation. 
The suit is American Petroleum Institute, et al. vs. 
Knecht, et al.*° The oil companies that filed it seek 
to block Federal approval of the California coastal 
program on the grounds that both it and the environ- 
mental impact statement prepared on it are in- 
complete. 
The suit does not deal with the legality of the 
California program itself, which was established by 
the California Coastal Act. Rather the suit seeks to 
block Federal approval of the program.*77 
The companies argue that the California program 
is incomplete for twe reasons, and thus should net 
be approved under section 306 of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act.?7® One deficiency, they argue, is 
that while it creates guidelines and a process for 
developing a State coastal “management program,” 
it does not actually contain such a program. In effect, 
they say that it is not detailed enough, that it should 
not be approved until localities develop their specific 
plans under the State law." California and the U.S. 
Department of Justice, representing the Commerce 
Department, disagree, saying that the present guide- 
lines and process for administering them more than 
meet the requirements of the CZMA. 
Second, the companies argue that the present 
California program does not provide for “adequate 
consideration of the national interest” in the siting 
of energy facilities, citing that there is nothing in the 
California Coastal Act that explicitly calls for con- 
176 The complaint was filed on September 9, 1977, in U.S. 
District Court. A September 12 temporary restraining order from 
the court blocked approval of the California program by the 
Secretary of Commerce until a hearing could be held. On Octo- 
ber 7, after hearings, the temporary restraining order was modi- 
fied to allow the Secretary to approve the program, which was 
subsequently done, but with the proviso that section 307 pro- 
visions requiring Federal actions to be consistent with the State 
program will not become effective in California’s case unless and 
until the court rules that the program is indeed complete. Court 
proceedings are continuing under Judge Robert J. Kelleher of 
the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles. 
177 The California Coastal Act itself is an important example 
of the “newer” approach to siting and to land use in general. 
It includes detailed performance standards to guide both ap- 
plicants and the regulators. It establishes procedures for coordi- 
nating the Coastal Commission with other State agencies, includ- 
ing the California Energy Commission. There are provisions 
facilitating public participation. It coordinates State and local 
government by allowing for delegation of coastal planning and 
the authority to issue permits to qualified cities and counties, 
while providing for appeal to the State commission. California 
also has passed a special law to expedite the selection of an 
LNG site along the State’s coast. 
178 Aside from arguing that the California program does not 
meet CZMA requirements, the companies also argue that 
xpproval should be blocked because: (1) the environmental 
impact statement on the program is inadequate because it did 
not discuss the possibility that California will use its consistency 
powers under section 307 to delay or veto OCS development and 
(2) the Office of Coastal Zone Management did not use correct 
precedures in approving the program, because it did not con- 
sider all the relevant evidence. 
172 “Plaintiffts’ Trial Brief,” American 
Knecht, pp. 56-59. 
etroleum Institute vs. 
IV—78 
