Table 6—2.—Potential importance of manganese nodules as a source of metals * 
i 
United States Free World 
Manga- Manga- 
Nickel Copper nese Cobalt Nickel Copper nese Cobalt 
1975 consumption 145 1,540 1,130 6.4 ‘470 6,000 6,000 20 
in thousand 
short tons 2 
Production from nodules 
as a percentage of 
1975 consumption ° for: 
2 20 1.6 38 59 6.1 0.4 Nee 19 
Million short tons of drv 4 40 3.3 Til 118 12.0 0.8 14.0 38 
nodules per year 6 60 4.9 115 177 18.0 1.3 22.0 58 
8 79 6.5 154 236 25.0 1.7 29.0 76 
1U.S. Department of the Interior, Ocean Mining Administration. Ocean Mining—An Economic Evaluation, by Rebecca L. Wright, 
Professional Staff Study, March 1976. 
*Commodity Data Summaries, U.S. Bureau of Mines; Metallgesellschaft AG; and ADL estimates. 
*90 percent recovery of metals; grades: Ni = 1.6%, Cu =1.4%, Mn = 24%, Co = 0.21%. 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference 
The manganese nodules on the deep seabed lie 
outside the jurisdiction of any country and are con- 
sidered the “common heritage of mankind.” For this 
reason, they have been the object of extensive nego- 
tiations under the auspices of the Third United Na- 
tions Law of the Sea Conference. To date the Con- 
ference has been unable to reach agreement on who 
has the right to mine the nodules and what interna- 
tional controls should be placed on those miners. 
The uncertainty of international legal and political 
developments bears directly on investments in ocean 
mining. Private companies are unwilling to advance 
ocean mining operations untii the legal situation is 
clarified. It is generally recognized that a long-term, 
stable climate for investment can best be accomp- 
lished through an international regulatory regime 
under a new law of the sea treaty. 
In 1975, after two substantive sessions of the 
Third United Nations Conference on Law of the 
Sea, a single negotiating text was drafted as the basis 
for future negotiations. This text was unacceptable 
to the United States because it contained no assur- 
ance that U.S. interests in maintaining access to these 
resources would be protected. A revised text devel- 
oped in spring 1976 contained a number of improve- 
ments from the U.S. point of view. A twe-part 
parallel system of development of deep seabed re- 
sources was devised. The first provided for mining 
by States and their nationals, which would be author- 
ized through contracts with the International Seabed 
Authority under reasonable terms and conditions; the 
second provided for developments directly by the 
Authority through its operational arm, the Enter- 
prise. This revised text attempted to balance and 
separate the powers and functions of the plenary 
organ, the Assembly, and the executive organ, the 
Vi- 
Council of the Authority. The major issues left 
unresolved were the composition and voting mech- 
anism of the Council of the Authority and the sta- 
tutes of the Enterprise and the Seabed Tribunal.*° 
At a later session in 1976, the developing coun- 
tries insisted on returning to basic issues and nothing 
more was resolved. In the 1977 session, a new nego- 
tiating text was introduced that was described by the 
U.S. Ambassador to the Conference, Elliot Richard- 
son, as “fundamentally unacceptable to the United 
States.” 1°3 In his testimony to the Senate in October 
1977, Ambassador Richardson enumerated the prob- 
lems of the latest deep seabed text: *°* 
@ It does not give the reasonable assurance of access 
that is necessary if the United States and others 
are expected to help finance the Enterprise and to 
accept a “parallel system” as a basis of compro- 
mise. 
e It could be read to make technology transfer by 
contractors a condition of access to the deep 
seabed, subject, at least in part, to negotiation in 
the pursuit of a contract. 
© It could be read to give the Seabed Authority the 
power to effectively mandate the Authority as a 
condition for access. 
e It fails to set clear and reasonable limits on the 
financial responsibility of contractors, possibly 
creating an obstacle to seabed development. 
e it sets an artificial limit on seabed production of 
minerals from nodules, which is not only objec- 
w:1J.$. Department of the Interior. Mining and Minerals 
Policy-—1977 Annual Report undey the Mining and Minerals Pol- 
icy Act of 1970. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 
1977, pp. 135--6. 
101 Richardson, Ambassador to the U.N. Law of the Sea 
Conference, Testimony before the Senate Committees on Com- 
merce and Energy and Natural Resources, October 4, 1977. 
1 Ibid. 
27 
