submergence technology intensified with the tragic 
loss of the nuclear submarine Thresher in April 
1963. The Navy’s inability to deal effectively with 
deepsea search and rescue in the instance of the 
Thresher resulted in reappraisal of the Navy’s under- 
sea programs. As a result, the deep submergence 
system review group recommended development of 
deep submergence rescue vessels (DSRV), deep 
submergence search vehicles (DSSV), and deep 
ocean survey vessels (DOSV). In June 1964, the 
Navy’s deep submergence system project was initi- 
ated. Under this project, two DSRVs were con- 
structed, a man-in-the-sea program produced the 
technology for saturation diving, and a deep ocean 
salvage program was initiated to develop the tech- 
nology to cover objectives from depths. Concur- 
rently, independent Navy engineering programs were 
involved in submersible development, which resulted 
in a number of vehicles coming on line in subsequent 
years. 
An additional boost was given to submersible 
technology development in 1966 when a midair col- 
lision over the coast of Spain resulted in the loss of 
an undetonated H-bomb in 2,000 to 3,000 feet of 
water. Three manned submersibles were deployed 
for the search. Alvin discovered the projectile at 
2,800 feet and the Navy unmanned vehicle, CURV 
(controlled underwater research vehicle) was de- 
ployed for the recovery. The investment decision to 
accelerate development of submersibles after the 
Thresher incident was credited as making the suc- 
cessful recovery of the bomb possible.*? 
Industry saw an investment potential for commer- 
cial and military use of submersibles in the middle 
1960s and responded to the market with updates of 
earlier prototypes. Interest in submersible develop- 
ment continued to expand in the late 1960s, and a 
number of new submersibles were launched in 1967— 
68. In 1969, the Navy advanced submersible tech- 
nology significantly with the launching of the NR-/, 
using nuclear power, which provided virtually un- 
limited range. 
Overcapitalization in submersibles, extraordinarily 
high operating expenses, and reductions in the Navy 
R&D budget after 1968 ended the period of acceler- 
ated growth in submersible technology,” In 1970, 
the Navy’s own submersibles met most of its needs 
for such vehicles. The consequent lack of Navy sub- 
mersible leasing significantly undercut the market for 
industry-owned research submersibles. As a conse- 
quence smaller, more economical vehicles appeared: 
Neckton Beta and Gamma, which leased for 
$1,000/day, replaced vehicles requiring $6,000 to 
$14,000/day. 
The Navy received delivery on the first deep sub- 
mergence rescue vehicle (DSRV—/) in 1970, and 
what was originally to be a 12 DSRV fleet under the 
post-Thresher plans, stabilized at 2 vehicles with the 
delivery of the DSRV—2 in 1971. The recommenda- 
tions to build OSSVs and DOSVs were never im- 
plemerted because of projected high costs and the 
lack of supportable requirernent. 
The Navy, however, continues to have a major 
interest in manned undersea operations. As the first 
Federal agency to develop an interest in the use of 
submersibles, the Navy remains today as the prin- 
cipal Federal owner and operator of these vehicles 
(table 7—4). As noted earlier, the Navy submersible, 
Alvin, operated by the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution, is considered a national oceanographic 
facility and is available for scientific investigation 
through UNOLS. 
The vehicles built in the early 1970s were de- 
signed for shallow dives at 1,000- to 2,000-foot 
depths. Most were built for foreign customers, and 
most of them (13 out of 20) were fabricated over- 
seas. The foreign market was spurred by the needs 
of the oil companies to develop the North Sea Con- 
tinental Shelf. Large American companies, once the 
leaders in submersible technology, have all but 
stopped construction; and unleased, commercial 
vehicles have been drydocked for lack of market 
potential. The Federal Government now has only 
a modest leasing program for scientific and environ- 
mental research through NOAA’s Manned Undersea 
Science and Technology (MUS&T) program. *% 
The present U.S. submersible fleet has 30 vehicles. 
Of these, perhaps only one-half perform missions 
during any single year.** Despite the prospects for 
increased oil and gas activity on the Outer Conti- 
nental Shelf, there is little indication that submersibie 
use will increase significantly in the near future. 
Ocean Engineering and Technology Development 
Federal ocean engineering and technology pro- 
grams encompass a wide gamut of activities as di- 
verse as the missions of the sponsoring agencies. 
While these efforts include basic technology develop- 
ment, they are largely directed to specific short-term 
31R, Frank Busby. Manned Submersibles. Washington, D.C., 
Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 52. 
82 Ibid., p. 58. 
objectives, rather than laying the basis for meeting 
long-term ocean engineering requirements. 
The importance of general purpose technology 
was recognized by the Stratton Commission,*° which 
23.U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
Manned Undersea Science and Technology Fiscal Year 1975 
Report, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1976. 
44 Ibid. 
35 Our Nation and The Sea, op.cit. note 6, p. 31. 
VII-19 
