To examine this controversy and MarAd’s situa- 
tion, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com- 
mittee established a special Ad Hoc Committee on 
Maritime Education and Training. It and the Com- 
mittee’s Merchant Marine Subcommittee held a 
series of hearings on the subject during 1974 and 
1975.46 
During these hearings MEBA argued that it should 
play a major role in training new engine officers, and 
the academies argued that they should play the 
major role. Each group blamed the surplus of officers 
on the other. There were also other criticisms. The 
academies accused MEBA of hiring discrimination, 
saying not only that the union was taking few new 
members, but also that its rules enabled Calhoon 
School graduates to get the few new jobs that existed. 
MEBA in turn argued that the academies had no 
business turning out large numbers of new officers 
when there were no seagoing jobs for them. 
It appears that the academies and MEBA each had 
a point. The Calhoon School was intended to meet 
the perceived Viet Nam era shortage of engine offi- 
cers, but was continued after the war and now sup- 
plies about one hundred new officers each year. The 
school receives Federal money, albeit indirectly. Its 
funds come from the shipping companies, as deter- 
mined by labor contracts. Many of these companies 
receive MarAd operating differential subsidies and 
since 1974 have been able to receive subsidies to 
cover much of these training expenses. *7 
Most importantly, MEBA gave employment prefer- 
ence to Calhoon School graduates over academy 
graduates. The General Accounting Office has de- 
scribed how this worked.*® Essentially, MEBA cre- 
ated a category for new engineers with a certain 
amount of training at sea on MEBA-controlled ships; 
those in this category got jobs, whereas those not in 
it rarely did. Calhoon School graduates met this re- 
quirement, academy students trained on academy 
ships did not. 
At the same time, however, it is also true that 
generally the academies did not cut back their en- 
rollments and continued to graduate large numbers 
of officers, even though the deep-sea employment 
situation was bleak and MarAd had imposed a ceil- 
ing on the number of Federally subsidized students. 
Being semiautonomous, they continued to operate 
largely as before. In fact, in the late 1960s there was 
some expansion of the student bodies, particularly 
at the Massachusetts school. 
In the debate over who should train officers and in 
what numbers, academy proponents made several 
arguments. One—made now as well as then—is that 
“Tbid., which covers most of the basic issues and arguments 
involyed in the controversy. 
“Thid., pp. 12-13. 
* U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, op. cit. note 41, 
pp. 18-19. 
the schools and their enrollment levels should be 
judged not only because they contribute to the deep- 
sea fleet, but also because their graduates do valuable 
work in shore-based maritime jobs, in inland and 
offshore operations, and in the Navy. Others argue 
that a college education is good preparation for an 
officer and, moreover, is beneficial because it gives a 
young graduate a wide range of future job options. 
Recently, some also have argued that academy en- 
rollments should be maintained because of the pos- 
sible future shortages of young officers. If it is true 
that the era of surpluses is ending, they say, then 
this is not the time to reduce the academies’ role in 
supplying both deck and engine officers. 
Others disagree with these points. Critics point 
out that these colleges are the only instances of the 
Federal Government providing education in support 
of a private civilian industry, and argue that Federal 
support is justified only to the extent that they train 
people who will be available in case of national 
emergency. Some proponents respond that in an era 
when Federal and State governments spend large 
amounts of money on higher education, some $17 
million a year is not an excessive amount to spend 
in support of valuable schools with a long tradition 
of Government involvement. 
In 1975, the House Ad Hoc Committee issued a 
set of conclusions and recommendations based on 
its investigations. The main finding was:* 
“{T]he cyclical nature of the maritime in- 
dustry requires the imposition of quantita- 
tive controls on the flow of licensed officers 
into the maritime labor market. Basic prin- 
ciples of fairness demand that such quanti- 
tative controls be developed through a sound 
system of prospective planning. This type of 
planning has been seriously lacking in the 
past. It is therefore recommended that the 
Maritime Administration be directed to hold 
a meeting each year of representatives of all 
maritime schools which train individuals for 
initial licensing as officers for the purpose of 
establishing Federal support levels by dis- 
cussing and relating incoming enrollment 
levels of these institutions to the future 
numerical requirements of the U.S.-flag 
merchant fleet for licensed officers.” 
Beyond acknowledging the problem, this  state- 
ment by the Committee also recognizes two other 
factors. One is that the main leverage that MarAd 
has is setting “support levels,’ mainly the number 
*°U.S. Congress, House, Ad Hoc Committee on Maritime 
Education and Training. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Maritime Education and Training on Principal Institutions in the 
United States Which Train Individuals for !nitial Licensing as 
Merchant Marine Officers. 94th Congress, Ist session, Serial 
No. 94-D, 1975, p. 21. 
Vil{—20 
