This chapter discusses the organization of the 
Federal ocean program in the context of organiza- 
tional theory, the importance of organization in 
developing effective “functional policy,” the trade- 
offs of reorganization, and the historical development 
of ocean-related Government organization, and in- 
cludes an analysis of proposals that have been ad- 
vanced to reorganize the Nation’s ocean effort. 
More Effective Administration: An Elusive Goal of Government 
Trends in Governmental Organization 
Since Congressman Albert Gallatin sought to en- 
force the limits of appropriations against the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, in 1795, both 
the Congress and the President, like Diogenes in the 
quest for an honest man, have searched for better 
ways to conduct the business of Government. 
Administrations for decades have sought to re- 
organize the executive branch for one or more of 
the following reasons: (1) to deal with specific prob- 
lems, e.g., energy, housing, or social programs; (2) 
to improve efficiency and reduce waste; or (3) to 
Tecoup power from the bureaucracy. Congress, 
wherein the power to shape and form the Govern- 
ment resides (and from which the Presidency must 
obtain its comprehensive reorganizational powers), 
has also periodically sought reorganization for dif- 
ferent reasons—often in dissatisfaction with the way 
the Executive Branch administers the laws. 
The reports of the Dockery-Cockrel Commission 
(1895), Keep Committee (1909), Taft Commission 
(1913), Joint Committee on Reorganization (1923), 
Byrd Committee (1938), Brownlow Committee 
(1939), First and Second Hoover Commissions 
(1949 and 1955), and the Ash Council (1970) com- 
prise the remains of earnest attempts to reorganize 
the executive branch. Virtually every reorganiza- 
tion proposal heretofore has been based on the as- 
sumption that (1) administrative organizations should 
be structured by like functions and purpose, (2) 
overlapping functions should be minimized, and (3) 
control should be unified.‘ 
Reorganization trends invariably lead to proposals 
for larger Cabinet-level departments as a strategy to 
unify control and consolidate authority. As a conse- 
quence, prescriptions for reorganization have sug- 
gested the creation of ‘‘superdepartments” with 
mixed constituencies that cut across the lines of 
statutory responsibility and congressional commit- 
tee jurisdictions. While consolidation is the current 
vogue in Government organizations, a small number 
of commentators in public administration see the 
*U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs. Federal Energy Reorganization: Historical Perspective. 
94th Con., 2d sess., Ser. 94-46, 1976. 
*Peri E. Arnold. “Reorganization and Politics: A Reflection 
on the Adequacy of Administrative Theory.” Administrative Re- 
view May—June 1974: 206. 
tendency toward bigness as a series of tradeoffs 
between: good policy-making on one hand and good 
management on the other; management by narrow 
objectives contrasted with the difficulty of having to 
respond to mixed constituencies, and flexibility of 
management being substituted by layered, hierarchial 
management.” Responding to broad constituency 
interests and to multiple congressional committees 
places added burdens on large composite organiza- 
tions. On the other hand, smaller independent sub- 
Cabinet-level agencies are limited in effectiveness by: 
(1) potential for parochial response to narrow con- 
stituent groups: (2) inability to influence high-level 
policy decisions at the Cabinet level; (3) difficulties 
in coordinating policy among numerous small units; 
and (4) lack of critical mass to undertake large tasks 
in a comprehensive manner. 
Clearly_there is no panacea. Good organization— 
whatever form it may be—does net ensure successful 
policy and program execution, nor does poor organi- 
zation preclude them. The key is to coalesce related 
functions into a unit of government that has a critical 
mass sufficient to influence high-level policy, yet is 
small enough to pursue identifiable objectives and 
flexible enough to adapt to changing needs. 
The organization of government is in itself an art 
and not a science. The possible combinations and 
permutations for organizing governmental functions 
are almost infinite; moreover, organizational theory 
is of marginal value because of the reality of politics, 
the constraints imposed by governmental customs, 
traditional operating procedures, and established 
budgeting and accounting procedures. Like policy- 
making itself, the design of organizations must bal- 
ance conflicting objectives. The appropriateness of 
organizational arrangements depends on the nature 
of the policy problems with which they must deal.® 
The question of atmosphere, setting, and environ- 
ment in which the decisions and execution of policy 
are made is an oft-neglected quality of organization. 
® Warren G. Bennis. Changing Organizations: Essays on the 
Development and Evolution of Human Organization. New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1966. See also: J. C. Davies. ‘Reor- 
ganization of Federal Agencies.” Conservation Foundation 20 
October 1976, Washington, D.C. 
°U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for 
the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Final Report, Organization for 
Foreign Policy, June 1975, p. 1. 
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