these functions are separated or combined in a new 
organizational scheme significantly affects agency 
behavior. Since the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) was divided into the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nu- 
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the 93d 
Congress, most reorganizational proposals have sug- 
gested that responsibilities for promoting or develop- 
ing a resource should be separated from the respon- 
sibilities for regulating the industry involved. This 
premise, however, is neither a categorical imperative 
nor an article of faith. 
The recently created Department of Energy (DOE) 
has blended the responsibility for development and 
regulation of energy production and delivery into the 
organization by building safeguards in the regulatory 
system in order to maintain an arms-length relation- 
ship between promotional activities and regulatory 
practices. The current acceptance of the coexistence 
of these two functions in the same departmeni is 
based on a distinction between the two types of regu- 
latory activities: (1) that which is to control the 
economics, production, and competition within the 
industry, and (2) that which is to protect other 
values, e.g., environment, health and safety.*? The 
former, it is suggested, can safely be integrated with 
promotion, while the latter should remain separate. 
Therefore, it is the quality of the regulatory activity 
that determines the compatibility rather than the 
mere regulatory label. 
Recommendations for Reorganization 
A number of recommendations for executive reor- 
ganization have been made by study panels, com- 
missions, advisory committees, academicians, and 
legislators in recent years. Those of the Stratton 
Commission and NACOA concentrated on Federal 
ocean programs. The Ash Council, with a mandate 
to look broadly at programs related to natural re- 
sources, proffered recommendations that would en- 
compass all natural resource, ocean, atmosphere, and 
earth sciences. Professor John Norton Moore ad- 
dressed not only the problems of organizing Federal 
ocean programs within the Federal agencies, but also 
suggested changes in the organization of the Depart- 
ment of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and creation 
of a Cabinet-level Marine Affairs Council in the 
White House. Senator Ernest F. Hollings, on the 
other hand, introduced S. 3889 in the Second Session 
of the 94th Congress in which he proposed the crea- 
tion of a Department of Environment and Oceans 
(DOE). These efforts represent the conventional wis- 
dom on reorganizing the Government to execute the 
Nation’s ocean policy (fig. 9-4). 
Stratton Commission Recommendations (1969) ° 
The Stratton Commission’s report. Our Nation 
and the Sea,** concluded that: 
‘ 
*, . . the national ocean program recom- 
mended by this Commission can be 
achieved only by creating a strong civil 
agency within the Federal Government 
with adequate authority and adequate re- 
sources. No such agency provides an ade- 
quate base on which to build such an 
organization.” 
It proposed the creation of an independent ocean 
agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Agency (NOAA), which would include: 
e United States Coast Guard. 
e All of the entities included in NOAA except the 
National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center, 
National Data Buoy Development, and the Ma- 
rine Minerals Technology Center. 
“U.S. Congress, House. The Organization of Federal Energy 
Functions. H. Doc. 95-43, 95th Cong., Ist sess., 1977. 
"Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, 
and Resources, op. cit. note 30, p. 229. 
e@ Marine and anadromous fisheries functions of the 
Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife within 
the Department of the Interior. 
Because many of the new Federal ocean programs 
enacted since 1969 were rooted in recommendations 
by the Stratton Commission—coastal zone manage- 
ment, ocean dumping, fisheries management-—it was 
implicd by the Commission that such pregrams 
when implemented would be centered in the inde- 
pendent ocean agency. 
The rationale upon which the Commission based 
its organizational recommendation can be sumi.ar- 
ized as follows: 
e A major and diverse effort is required in the 
oceans, and the size and scope of such an effort 
cannot be fitted into an existing mission agency. 
e An independent agency would bring a fresh out- 
look and institutional freedom which are difficult 
to achieve in an old line agency. 
e It would be visible and draw greater public inter- 
est and support by developing a constituency. 
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