ment Division, most Department of the Interior 
programs, including those of the U.S. Geological 
survey, are reviewed in the Natural Resources Di- 
vision, and programs of the Bureau of Mines are 
considered by the Interior Department Branch. To 
the extent that the responsible budget analysts coor- 
dinate with their counterparts in other budget divi- 
sions, the fragmentation of the budget for ocean- 
related activities can be partially overcome. 
Although it would be a difficult task, it is entirely 
possible to reassign budget responsibilities among 
the functional divisions of OMB to improve the com- 
prehensiveness of the “ocean budget” review. This 
could be achieved even in the absence of general 
governmental reorganization. The question obviously 
is whether the improved examination would be worth 
the difficulty in bringing about the reorganization, 
and whether it can be done for ocean agency budgets 
without disruptive effects on other agency reviews. 
The budget process, from program to agency to 
department and OMB, and through the President, is 
a quasi-adversarial proceeding of endless negotiations. 
Budget offices at all levels are cast in the role of 
critics. Appeals of budget decisions to higher au- 
thorities are available at all stages in the budget 
process, including the ability of Cabinet Officers to 
appeal OMB decisions to the President for final 
resolution, although this is rarely done. 
Whether budget decisions drive the policy, or 
whether policy decisions drive the budget is an im- 
portant unknown. In any event, the budget is an 
imperfect decision mechanism. Zero-based budget- 
ing, however, has the potential for bringing policy- 
making and the budget into closer correspondence. 
TX-35 
