Upon the return of Dr, Morse to the United States, offi- 

 cial approval was given to plans to assign at least two ASWORG 

 men to the United Kingdom to provide liaison with the British 

 Antisubmarine Operations Research work. These representatives 

 of ASWORG were to be assigned to Commander Naval Forces in 

 Europe and would work under the direction of Capt, Solberg, 

 One of the two men, it was planned, would spend most of his 

 time in maintaining liaison with the Coastal Command, The 

 other would spend most of his time at the Admiralty maintain- 

 ing contact with the Operations Research workers there. The 

 British were warm in their approval of this proposal. 



Tenth Fleet. 



Toward the close cf 1942, evidence of divided authority 

 began to trouble those responsible for the success of the anti- 

 submarine effort. Operating units were scattered among sea 

 frontiers, each cf which had its own tactical doctrine plan- 

 ning staff and intelligence organization, and was more or less 

 autonomous. The squadrons of the Anti-submarine Command, AAF, 

 were controlled operationally by the Eastern Sea Frontier, 

 Several squadrons were subsequently sent to Africa where they 

 were under still another, operational command. Army squadrons 

 were supplied to the Caribbean Sea Frontier by the First Antilles 

 Air Task Force, Some of the Anti-submarine Command squadrons 

 were assigned to England where they were controlled by the 

 Coastal Command, RAF, 



A proposal that all AAF anti-submarine activities be uni- 

 fied under the Anti-submarine Command would have provided a 

 certain unity so far as training and equipment went, but the 

 operational control cf the Army planes would still have been 

 divided, 



A solution was found by the establishment in May 1943 of 

 the Tenth Fleet with Admiral Ernest J. King as Commander, Tenth 

 Fleet, and Rear Admiral F, S, Low as Chief of Staff, 



The division of operational authority which had caused the 

 establishment of the Tenth Fleet had had an adverse effect on 

 the work of Group M. Those assigned to the Army Anti-submarine 

 Command found themselves working on plans for training and 

 material which often differed from Navy plans for naval air- 

 craft. Tactical doctrine diff red and there was inevitably a 

 certain amount of rivalry in pushing new equipment developments, 

 thus making for duplication of technical effort, ITo two sea 



52 - 



