CHAPTER VIII 



TACTICAL- TECHNICAL INTERPLAY IN THE 

 ANTI-SUBMARINE WAR* 



The second tine within a generation in which the United 

 States found itself involved in a war in Europe saw our for- 

 tunes again bound up with those of Great Britain As in World 

 War I, World War II found us committed to the support of this 

 ally whose ability to contain the Germans on the west consti- 

 tuted our eastern' first line of defense. Thus, we had to 

 supply the British Isles, and as the war progressed and we 

 pushed our offensive toward Europe, we had to supply the forces 

 we had advanced into the United Kingdom, Africa, Italy, and 

 finally France and Germany. 



The Logistical Problem . 



The ant i- submarine war was primarily a war to keep secure 

 the transatlantic routes of supply. As such, it posed the 

 following logistical problem: 



Great Britain has customarily maintained afloat approxi- 

 mately 20,000,000 gross tons of merchant shipping consisting 

 of some 2,500 ocean-going vessels of 6,500 gross-tons average 

 and an equal number of coastal ships of 1,200 gross-tons 

 average. In the past two wars in which Great Britain has had 

 the United States as one of her allies, those allies plus 

 friendly neutrals have had available another 20,000,000 -ross 

 tons of shipping. 



Cut off from Europe, the United Kingdom at war must de- 

 pend primarily on transatlantic supplies in order to exist. 

 In 1943, the total imports to the United Kingdom averaged ap- 

 proximately 3,600,000 long tons a month, more than 80 per cent 

 of this tonnage being carried by the North Atlantic convoy 

 system. 



"""This chapter is based almost entirely on a report entitled 

 " Ant i- Submarine Warfare in World War II," prepared by the Opera- 

 tional Evaluation Group (Report 51, Part I) of the Navy Depart- 

 ment, used by permission of the U. S. Navy Department. 



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