in the United States, attained a rate of production exceeding 

 the rate of shipping loss and for the first time, the Allies 

 were able to conclude a period with a greater tonnage of avail- 

 able shipping than at the period's start. 



During a major part of Period V an average cf more than 

 100 Uo boats were at sea. Their number was so great that 

 while concentrating against the all-important Allied convoys 

 in the Northwest Atlantic , they were able at the same time to 

 conduct campaigns against shipping in the Caribbean, Brazil, 

 Freetown and Southeast Atlantic areas. 



October 1942 saw 93 ships of 514,000 gross tons fall 

 victim to the U-boats, U-boats in the Northwest Atlantic 

 area alone rose to an average of 22 during the month. Their 

 attacks were in the mid-ocean gap beyond the range of land- 

 based Allied aircrafto Another group of U-boats, operating 

 between Natal and Dakar, forced the Allies to route South 

 Atlantic shipping via the Panama Canal and Cape Horn to Cape- 

 town, This created a new soft spot on which two packs of 6 

 U-boats quickly capitalized,, In the Capetown and South 

 Indian Ocean areas, they sank 25 ships during the month. 



Another U-boat concentration centered east of the Azores 

 and Madeira, Sensing that an invasion of North Africa was in 

 the making, but fortunately failing to guess the exact points 

 of assault, the Germans attempted to lie in wait for the in- 

 vading armada. In this they failed. The ships of the invasion 

 were able to pass through a concentration cf between 30 and 40 

 U-boats and reached Gibraltar with no losses while troops were 

 aboard, though the invasion fleet was mauled on its return 

 journey. Losses incident to the invasion totalled only 134,000 

 gross tons, of which 84,000 tons of shipping and 5 naval ves- 

 sels were lost as a result of U-boat attacks. 



The situation grew worse in November 1942, when world- 

 wide losses cf shipping from all causes reached the ivar's high 

 point of 862,000 tons, of which losses from U-boats accounted 

 for 116 ships of 712,000 gross tons. 



The Allies made frantic attempts to step up their coun- 

 termeasures. In December 1942 sinkings by U-boats fell to 

 62 ships of 344,000 tons and in January 1943 to 34 ships of 

 203,000 gross tons. But bad weather had much to do with the 

 lower losseSj, and the Allies were not deluded into believing 

 that the U-boat menace had disappeared. Evidence that the 

 Allies' apprehensions were fully warranted was the fate of 



YO 





