available because we did not have advance warning of the Japanese attack, which was a complete 
surprise to Germany s political and military leaders. 
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Ships was equipping all available ipTsy Sub-chasers, motor boats, 
yachts, etc., with lightweight Sonar. Production facilities at the Submarine Signal Company and 
RCA were expanded greatly; additional contracts were made with Bell Laboratories, Western 
Electric, Bludworth Company, and others. The British lend-leased us 10 Corvettes, having first 
trained our crews in Britain to use the Asdic; we obtained 24 Asdic-fitted small patrol craft from 
Canada, and by March 1942, began our coastal convoying with a pitiful small number of ships and 
land-based planes. 
During this period the Roosevelt-Churchill team planned the eventual invasion of Europe - 
the two Navies were to deliver vast armies and tremendous supplies. But, U-boats were sinking 
ships faster than we replaced them, and we were losing the Battle of the Atlantic. Our success 
in attacking U-boats after we detected them was less than 5 per cent - 95 out of 100 got away. 
Sonar was detecting the U-boats, but in the crucial moments of the attacks, something was 
inadequate. 
To find the solution the Navy Department assigned to NDRC (Div. VI) the project of provid- 
ing Statistical analysis of past operations, theoretical detailed studies of tactical doctrines, opera- 
tional analysis of Sonar attacks and of equipment and weapons in order to prescribe for their 
best use and assist in improving their design. Accordingly, the Anti-Submarine Warfare Opera- 
tional Research Group (ASWORG) headed by Dr. P.M. Morse, was established with representatives 
in offices of practically all fleet units headquarters including the British Admiralty. Britain’s 
Operational Analysis Group, which had been furnishing information to the Commander, U.S. Naval 
Forces Europe Technical Staffin London, also furnished ASWORG with statistics of the Royal 
Navy's 21/2 years war experience. We adopted the best known methods of convoying, Asdic 
screening and Searching, attacks on U-boats, etc., and our attack successes increased. Likewise, 
our ships reported attack details to ASWORG whose detailed analyses soon paid dividends. 
Another expedient was the establishment at Boston of an Anti-Submarine Warfare School 
in addition to the schools at San Diego and Key West. Instruction given was in three categories: 
training enlisted men as Sonar operators, training officers to interpret and apply the Sonar data, 
and training crews to function automatically and efficiently as a coordinated attack team. The 
gratifying results eventually led to establishing about forty similar activities which were attended, 
in addition to enrolled trainees, by some crews of Ships lying in port between voyages. Sonar 
attack teams spent their infrequent shore leaves on a typical Postman’s Holiday. 
College professors and experienced educators developed high-speed mass indoctrination 
methods for Sonar students. The University of California Division of War Research (UCDWR) 
devised a method of psychological selection of Sonar operators since men differed widely in 
ability to hear echoes above reverberation and background noise. School equipments developed 
by the NDRC team of Harvard, Columbia, UCDWR, and others, included several types of listening 
teachers, sound classification trainers, echo repeaters, bearing and ranging recorder interpreters, 
torpedo detector devices, etc. A valuable contribution was phonograph recordings of actual 
U-boat sounds which were furnished by the British. Complete Sonar equipments were employed, 
electronic attack teachers displayed escort versus U-boat maneuvers, and graduate training was 
done at sea using towed underwater targets and actual submarines. 
In the summer of 1942 the British added an Anti-Submarine Warfare unit to the British 
Admiralty Delegation in Washington in order to maintain close liaison on the conduct of the anti- 
U-boat warfare and technical developments. Eventually about 700 British Officers and Ratings, 
while awaiting completion of Britain s share of the 500 destroyer escorts we were building, at- 
tended our fleet sound Schools, These experienced British U-boat killers greatly influenced our 
training methods. 
At sea we were assuredly losing the war. Convoys required 70 days for Atlantic round 
trips. During June 1942, an average of 48 U-boats operating at sea continually sank 143 ships. 
27e &- 2805 
