premises that lack of basic scientific information was a Serious handicap in the design and effec- 
tive use of equipment. 
A laboratory was established at San Diego under the University of California Division of 
War Research, and sponsorship of formal work at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution was 
taken over. Several research groups were Set up under Columbia University Division of War Re- 
search, including a Theoretical Analysis Group, the Underwater Sound Reference Laboratories, 
and a Sonar Laboratory at New London (resulting in the establishment of the USN Underwater 
Sound Laboratory, New London). The services of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography were 
enlisted, and contracts were made with Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard,| Univer - 
Sity of lowa, etc. In addition, NDRC field groups were stationed in and visited all active theaters 
including Britain. (Names of universities, organizations, industries, etc. mentioned herein hap- 
pened to be convenient in this presentation; however, contributions by many others not mentioned 
were, in many cases, of equal magnitude and value) 
Prominent scientists, including Nobel prize winners, sought more effective means of find- 
ing Submarines, Extensive experiments were tried off San Diego by the California Division of 
War Research with very powerful underwater search lights and flares. Although the light could 
be seen for Several hundred feet in the Sea, it was impossible to detect outlines of submerged 
object because the light was so badly scattered and diffused. Various other types of electrical 
and magnetic detection methods were also tried by scientific and engineering groups in the Atlan- 
tic and Pacific without much success. The sea proved practically impenetrable to long and short 
radio waves, radar, infra-red, ultra-violet and other types of radiation. Scientific and engineer - 
ing effort was thenceforth concentrated on further development of the Navy’ S existing underwater 
sound techniques. Britain contributed her entire history on scientific investigations of under- 
water Sound. 
During the summer of 1941, U-boats began “wolf pack” attacks and raided off Greenland and 
Newfoundland. An east-bound convoy was attacked before escorts joined and ten ships were sunk. 
About July the British began escorting convoys entirely across the Atlantic even though fewer 
Asdic fitted escorts could be assigned each convoy. Then the President announced that the safety 
of our country required the basing of forces in Iceland. In September the United States declared 
its policy of protecting all ships carrying Lend Lease materials and U.S. Navy vessels joined 
the escorts. The U.S. destroyers, KEARNEY and REUBEN JAMES, were torpedoed by the Nazis. 
About this time the British captured the U570, one of the only two U-boats taken “alive or 
dead” during the war. She proved to be a valuable source of information. One of the U-boats 
sound equipment is an underwater telegraph system containing a pair of small transducers con- 
taining electro-magnets composed of four-inch lengths of nickel stampings surrounded by a mag- 
netising coil. The second set is a long range listening device containing an array of 24 three- 
inch diameter microphones on each bow which are fed through a phasing network to an amplifier 
and earphones. It is not accurate enough to fire torpedoes by, but convoys could be heard up to 
about ten miles away under good water conditions. No echo ranging search set was on board - 
apparently either the Nazis had not developed any or else they wisely had calculated that ping- 
ing Submarines could be detected easily. The Asdic Sonar brotherhood conducted trials with 
U-570 sound equipment and promulgated their analysis to Allied Navies and Merchantmen for 
use in countering U-boats’ tactics. 
During 1941 another 1118 ships had been sunk, averaging 93 per month. The Germans now 
had about 200 U-boats, an average of 32 operating at sea continually. The Asdic-Sonar fitted 
escorts totalled about ‘800 of which 500 were oceangoing. 30 U-boats plus 15 Italian subs had 
been sunk, averaging 4 per month. 
When the United States entered the war, our 170 destroyers were the only U.S. surface 
craft fitted with echo ranging Sonar; 3/4 of them were engaged in cross-Atlantic convoying; the 
others were employed in the Pacific. Our unescorted Atlantic seaboard shipping was slaughtered 
at the rate of 75 ships per month by an average of 38 U-boats of which we killed about 3 per 
month. Many of these sinkings occurred within sight of our coasts. The Japs’ 75 subs were Sink- 
ing 10 ships per month in the Far East. These tremendous losses might have been greater 
judging from Gross Admiral Doenitz’ statement, “Additional U-boats were, unfortunately, not 
Re A- 2405 
