OF BATTLESHIP DESIGN. 93 
width of an ocean, they must possess such speed, endurance and radius of action as 
to effectively wage war in any waters of the world. 
Thus do our national policies exercise a very legitimate control on battleship 
design. 
STRATEGY, TACTICS AND DESIGN. 
Besides recommending a MIine 3 program providing for the number of bat- 
tleships to be constructed each year, the General Board defines the military charac- 
teristics of our battleships, namely, the size and arrangement of battery, extent of 
protection, speed, and radius of action, indicating the relative importance of the 
various main features. This definition of military characteristics is reached after 
having compared our national policies with those of other states as to the most 
probable sources of conflict, and after having considered the numbers and types of 
battleships of our most probable opponents. In arriving at these decisions the 
most valuable aids are the data derived from the analysis of the strategical prob- 
lems and tactical studies of the war-game worked out either by the game-board of 
the War College or by the movements of actual ships of the fleet simulating a naval 
engagement. These studies have shown conclusively that— 
Under modern conditions the gun is the principal weapon of the battleship, and 
concentration of superior gun fire at the decisive point at the critical time is always 
the key to victory. 
With equal units, naval gun power can be assumed to vary as the square of 
the number of guns that can be brought to bear.* 
The mere possession of a greater number of units is useless unless this su- 
periority in number can be employed in a concentrated way at the proper time. 
There should be no reserves in a naval battle. 
“The entire force should be brought into action as nearly simultaneously as 
possible, so distributed as to afford mutual support, and if practicable in such man- 
ner as to isolate a part of the enemy from the battle while the remainder is being 
defeated.” 
Reasoning from the above premises, it is obvious that concentration of arma- 
ment constitutes an overwhelming advantage and is in fact an absolute necessity. 
The great length of battle line and the great difficulties in maneuvering due to the 
number of units in the present day fleet imperatively demand that, from the point 
of view of gun fire, as many main battery guns as possible should be concentrated 
on as few units as possible. 
*“Suppose Fi, F2 opposed to A, all three being identical hive, each capable of firing one round a minute, 
and assumed to be put out of action by four rounds. 
A would be destroyed by Fi+ F2 in two minutes. Fi-+ F2 ould be destroyed by A in eight minutes. 
Therefore *T** — 4 That is, the fighting value of two vessels fighting one is four times as great as that 
of one vessel fighting two. Similarly, three vessels fighting two would stand to them, in point of fighting 
See Baudry, “The Naval Battle,” p. 99. 
value, in the ratio of To 
