OF BATTLESHIP DESIGN. 95 
cause the problems of mounting such guns in triple-gun turrets are not yet solved 
and in no other way can the demands of concentration of armament be satisfied.* 
Speed.—For both strategical and tactical reasons high speed is extremely de- 
sirable. If we accept the principle that an active offense is the best defense, speed 
is essential both for bringing the enemy to action and for maintaining the most 
suitable range during action. Moreover, speed, when employed in skillful ma- 
-neuver, assists us to gain that relative numerical superiority which is so essential 
for concentration. Later on it is proposed to recur to this question of speed in con- 
sidering the length of battleships, and when the excessive cost of even 2 knots 
greater speed than that of the enemy is appreciated, it is altogether probable that 
we should rely on fast battle-cruisers to gain the above advantages rather than at- 
tempt to attain too great superiority of speed with the battleships. 
No other single feature of a ship has so large an influence on displacement, 
and every fraction of a knot sacrificed will allow the displacement to be reduced 
many hundreds of tons. Great ships of this type will always cruise in squadron, 
and the speed of the squadron will be the speed of the slowest unit. This speed is 
a function of so many variables—condition of bottom, quality of coal, skill of per- 
sonnel, condition of machinery, danger of machinery troubles at maximum speeds 
—and the cost incident to any material increase is so unreasonably great that it 
would seem wiser to adopt comparatively moderate speed. 
Armor.—tThere will always be a difference of opinion as to the relative im- 
portance of guns, speed and armor, but in no one of these three military charac- 
teristics is there such a wide divergence of views as in the case of armor. One 
authority advocates “external protection,’ completely excluding the shell; another 
advocates “internal protection,” limiting to a minimum destructive effect after pene- 
tration; one advocates protection to vitals only, another complete protection; one 
advocates vertical side armor, another horizontal deck armor. All admit, however, 
that at the present time the gun bids fair to be the permanent victor over armor. It 
is not feasible to mount armor of such thickness and area as to exclude all shell, 
yet at least we should provide such protection to buoyancy and stability, and to 
magazines, firerooms, engine-rooms, and other vital parts as will render them, as 
far as possible, safe from all but the largest shell at normal impact. This can be 
done with the least expenditure of weight by means of vertically disposed side ar- 
mor. To protect against shell fragments and to preserve buoyancy we must have 
at least one protective deck located above the deepest possible load line. 
The minimum reasonable requirement of armor, therefore, aside from the 
local protection of turrets, barbettes, conning-tower, and base of smoke-pipes af- 
forded by their own armor, is a belt extending high enough above the normal load 
water-line to protect the stability, buoyancy and vital military features of the ship, 
and extending low enough to guard against underwater hits due to naval action, 
*For further arguments in favor of restricting the number of turrets to four, see Sir William White’s 
paper before the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1910, and Lieutenant Viani’s paper in 
Supplement to Revista Maritime, 1908. 
