96 MILITARY AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
rolling of ship, or heel due to damage. Coupled with this there should be at least 
one protective deck—all to be of the greatest practicable thickness. 
Endurance.—Other great nations of the world as well as the United States 
have long since abandoned the fallacy of building battleships for coast defense, 
with consequent small radius of action. As previously pointed out, our battleships 
should be capable of waging successful war in the waters of our most probable ene 
mies. Since these waters are separated from our own by the width of an ocean, the 
radius of action of our battleships should be sufficient to traverse this distance to 
and fro at probable fleet speed, with an additional 2,000 miles or so to cover the 
cruising that may be necessary until contact can be made with the enemy. This 
would hardly be practicable with a smaller radius of action than 8,000 miles at 12 
knots. Fortunately the advent of fuel oil, together with increased efficiency of 
ship-form and propulsive machinery, renders it possible to meet this claim with 
comparative ease. 
Protection against Torpedo Attack.—The gun seems certain to remain the su- 
preme weapon of offense, but this superiority is challenged more and more by the 
formidable menace of the torpedo and mine. No battleship has ever been provided 
with any sure defense against either of these dangers, and the weakest feature of 
all existing battleships is their lack of adequate protection against underwater at- 
tack. Even now the largest unit of any fleet can be put almost, if not quite, “out 
of action” by a single torpedo, and in the future there is little to prevent the use 
of much larger explosive charges to offset any increased subdivision or underwater 
armor that may be provided. It seems probable, therefore, that the chief defense 
against this form of attack will consist in a somewhat increased speed of battle- 
ships and a cordon of high-speed units of the destroyer type. In addition to the 
protection thus afforded, every possible provision should still be made to minimize 
the results of successful torpedo attack, and it will therefore be necessary to provide 
suitable minute watertight subdivisions and even armor—all of which must add 
materially to displacement. j 
This comparatively new effectiveness of the submarine and its weapon, the 
torpedo, must exercise a powerful influence on the size and cost of individual units, 
and it is not at all improbable that the eventual development of the submarine may 
result in driving the battleship from the sea. He would indeed be a rash prophet 
who would venture to predict when this will come to pass, but until then the develop- 
ment of the battleship type must move forward, or else the type must be abandoned 
altogether. 
TECHNICAL LIMITATIONS. 
The above are the most essential military characteristics to be incorporated into 
the design of our battleships, although there are many others of lesser importance 
that require due consideration, such as secondary battery, torpedo armament, and 
type of propulsive machinery. After they are decided the problem presented to 
the naval architect involves such technical characteristics as buoyancy, stability, 
maneuvering qualities, and strength. On account of the great number of vari- 
