100 MILITARY AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
ture of money it is possible to provide one-third more gun power on larger vessels 
than on smaller vessels each of gun power equivalent to one-half the larger vessels. 
If the caliber of guns in the two fleets be assumed equal, then the larger ships 
possess a one-third greater numerical superiority. This would indicate that the 
fighting power of the large ships with relation to that of the small ships is in the 
2 
proportion of (*) Paes Leger 
3 9 
Furthermore, the destructive value of a fleet is determined not only by the fight- 
ing value of its units, but by the method of employing that fighting value. The 
principal factors in connnection with the method of employing fighting value are (1) 
maneuver, and (2) fire control. Maneuver enables a fleet to gain that relative nu- 
merical superiority of guns required by the principle of concentration. The fewer 
number of units in the fleet of large ships allows a greater ease of maneuver on 
account of the handiness of a short line as compared with the clumsiness of a long 
one, apart from such matters as visibility of signals, etc. If it is argued that the 
smaller and therefore more numerous fleet possesses a larger power of combination, 
the answer is that in a naval battle it is not power of combination that we desire 
but power of concentration. 
From the point of view of fire control, the big ship again has a great advan- 
tage. Assume three small ships fighting one large one. To anyone who has wit- 
nessed long-range target practice and attempted to spot the fall of salvos, it is at 
once apparent how extremely difficult, if not indeed impossible, it would be to identify 
the salvos of the three smaller ships as they fall about the large one, whereas the 
fire-control officer and spotter of the single large ship can concentrate their salvos 
on either one or two of the smaller ships, identifying unerringly each salvo. The 
advantage of the small ships due to the “dispersion of target” offered by them 
would be more than counterbalanced by the great handicap of being unable to iden- 
tify their salvos. 
CONCLUSION. 
Since the ultimate purpose in modern war is the disruption and destruction of 
the organized forces of the enemy, the purpose of our battleship fleet is neither the 
defense of our coast, the blockade of the enemy’s fleet in his ports, the capture of 
sea-coast forts, nor even the “command of the sea.” Its mission—its sole mission— 
is battle, the complete and relentless destruction of the enemy’s battle fleet. To 
this end it must possess at the outset and maintain by maneuver during battle that 
relative superiority which is the key of all decisive battles by land or by sea. This 
can be obtained most certainly, and at a much less cost per gun, by concentration of 
fighting power in large units. 
It has been shown that the fulfilment of the present-day claims on the military 
and technical characteristics of battleship design imperatively demands a ship of 
*See page 93. 
