SS. ee 
i il lie ie 
ON THE SUITABILITY OF CURRENT DESIGN OF SUBMARINES TO 
THE NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
By Carrarn W. L. Ropeers, U. S. Navy, Associate. 
[Read at the twenty-fourth general meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, held in 
New York, November 16 and 17, 1916.} 
In accepting the invitation which the secretary of the Society did me the honor 
to extend in asking me to contribute a paper on submarines, I do not assume that he 
had any idea that I would undertake to tell the members of this Society anything in 
regard to the technical and mechanical features of submarines, with which they 
are already well acquainted. 
But, as president of the Naval War College some years ago, and ever since 
then, I have given attention to the strategic and tactical fields of work which are 
open to submarines in naval warfare. A sketch of these fields and a consideration 
of possible modifications and variations in design of submarines to meet the re- 
quirements of warfare seem to me to offer interest to naval architects, and it is 
along these lines that this paper will be developed. 
In thus discussing the subject, it must be borne in mind that while the construc- 
tional and engineering possibilities of design are pretty well known and form a 
stock of knowledge common to designers of all nations, nevertheless the application 
of this stock of knowledge to the production of concrete designs suitable to the 
national policy and geographic situation of particular nations will result in types of 
ships which will differ much according to nationality. This paper will consider 
some of the controlling factors which should influence American design. In so 
doing we need not fear the betrayal of any national secret. It is the business of 
foreign navies through the agency of their general staffs not only to study in ad- 
vance the requirements of their own forces, but also to examine the situation of 
other powers which may become hostile to them so as to draw deductions as to the 
enemy’s probable efforts and employment of his forces. 
Any enemy in thus considering our types of submarines and their probable em- 
ployment in war will no doubt start from very much the same premises as we our- 
selves assume; namely, the well-known constructional possibilities of submarines 
varying with the progress of invention, the tactical development of the present 
war in attack by, and attack upon, submarines; and, finally, the national policies 
and geographic situation of the United States. 
Assuming the enemy has equally good reasoning power as ourselves, and grant- 
ing he knows the ordinary constructional data as to submarines, it is clear that he 
will necessarily arrive at conclusions much like our own. If we avoid general dis- 
cussion in the hope of withholding information from foreigners, it is ourselves 
