tt 
, 
TO THE NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 117 
of communication of the enemy, and on the advanced bases which he might possess, or which 
he might seize. 
Consider now the case of a war in which the enemy is a distinctly inferior power, perhaps 
separated from the bases of the United States by several thousand miles of ocean. Hlere, again, 
large submarines will be useful. The only case where small boats can be used is where the 
United States is in possession of a secure advanced base near the enemy’s coast, but at present 
no secure advance bases are found as against any naval power. 
Although very reluctant in expressing an opinion at variance with that of the distin- 
guished author of this paper, I cannot avoid the conclusion that in defensive as well as in offen- 
sive warfare the United States will urgently need a great number of moderately large sub- 
marines, that is, boats like the British E-Class, the German U 33-42 type, or the type de- 
signed by Mr. Spear, described under the name of Type B, 1914, in the paper on sub- 
marines which he read last year before this Society. All these boats are from 800 to 900 tons 
displacement, but it is quite likely that, as in the case of other warships, this type will tend 
to grow still larger in the future. 
Caprain A. P. Nrpsiack, Vice-President:—My remarks are intended not so much 
a discussion of this paper as a somewhat broader discussion of the question of submarines. 
Captain Rodgers, as a former president of the War College, and a recent member of the 
General Board, is in a position to discuss this question thoroughly from the standpoint taken 
in the paper. My remarks have in a measure no bearing on his paper, but apply to the lec- 
ture we had last evening in Mr. Ewertz’s presentation of the submarine question. 
I want to present a point of view which I think it is important a Society like this should 
take, and that is not the sentimental one, but the intelligent, intellectual one. I have been 
asked by many persons—many of whom I was surprised should ask the question—if I did 
not think the submarine was a cowardly, dirty weapon of warfare. I have replied that I 
did not see quite how, as a naval officer, I was in a position to say that or acquiesce in it, since 
our navy has been the one to develop the two types of submarines now used abroad by the 
two principal powers which are engaged in this war. The Holland type of boat was sold to 
the British Government, and was developed originally by Sir Philip Watts, and later by others, 
into quite a different boat, of course, from the original Holland boat. The Germans were 
much later in taking up the submarine question, and they preferred the Lake type, so their 
boat is a development of that type. 
Now there is no country in the world quite as interested as we are in the development 
of the submarine, and it would be a great mistake for us to get entirely too sentimental on the 
question. It is entirely a business proposition, and in all we do and say, and in all of our 
actions, we should be careful not to tie our own hands in the future, because we are certainly 
relying on the submarine as a weapon of warfare. 
I want also to present a point of view which I have arrived at in regard to submarines, 
and that is on this and all naval questions we take too much of a defensive attitude. We 
are always waiting for someone to kick us. Of course, if you get the defensive idea very 
strongly in your head, you are always thinking of the other fellow who is coming over to 
get you, and what you will do about it. Thatis not the way to design and buildanavy. You 
must design it on the principle that you are going over to get the other fellow. That is 
the way you will end the war, for that is the only way wars are ended. 
With reference to the submarine, we must adopt the offensive idea, and not take any 
