124 ON THE SUITABILITY OF CURRENT DESIGN OF SUBMARINES 
periscope, to torpedo the cruiser, but the periscope was discovered and struck by a shell, 
springing a leak in the submarine which forced her to come to the surface only to be sunk by 
gun-fire. That was the first lesson in the “limitations of a life’ for submarines in the day 
when Sir Percy Scott’s prediction that submarines would overmaster battleships was ring- 
ing throughout England and America. The great number of people who became adherents 
to that view is evidence of the general lack of knowledge of those times. Since then the 
experiences of the war have shown how weak and vulnerable submarines are in face of an 
enemy who has adequate command of the surface, especially in the comparatively shallow 
waters of the North Sea; and yet how powerful a force as influencing the moral factor for 
the purposes of coast defense, and for forcing a complete revolution in the strategy and 
tactics of the attacking fleet. The last mentioned considerations are of sufficient conse- 
quence to assure the shipbuilders that submarines have come to stay ; and the coast-defense 
type, for operation in limited areas, if adopted as our standard, would entail large numbers. 
This is already forecast in the last Naval Bill, reflecting, as it does, the views of the Navy 
Department as expressed in the testimony of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, the General Board, and the Chiefs of Bureaus, whose conclusion as to the coast 
defense type was the same as that reached in the present paper. Of the soundness of that 
conclusion there seems no doubt, not only for the leading reasons enumerated by Captain 
Rodgers but also on account of the fallacies contained in the arguments of those who have 
recently advocated the larger vessels of 800 tons displacement. A perusal of the testimony 
before the last session of the House Naval Committee will show the division of opinion 
sharply drawn between the department on the one hand and the fleet and submarine flotilla 
on the other, the latter contending that only vessels of the 800-ton size should be built out 
of the moneys carried in the bill, and this view was shared by practically all officers attached 
to submarines in service or building. It is well to remember here that this conflict of opin- 
ion was very pronounced and took a leading place in the minds of those most concerned 
with the preparation of the last Naval Bill, so much so that anxiety was felt, no doubt, by 
officers in general, lest out of such conflict of views the question might become so confused 
as to result in the withholding of further appropriations until the matter of size should 
be settled. 
There was unanimity of opinion as to the advisability of building the three so-called fleet 
submarines of the Schley type at 1,106 tons displacement, which were regarded as sufficient for 
experimental purposes, and the idea conveyed by the adoption of this type was in imitation 
of similar vessels built in Europe which were reputed to obtain the high speed of 20 knots. 
Speed was to be the principal desideratum and the object was to create a submarine that could 
travel with the fleet. As a matter of fact, the best estimates at present indicate that these 
vessels will probably be able to make as much as 19 knots, but are hardly expected to make 20. 
The advocates of the 800-ton size predicated their conclusions upon the reported opera- 
tions of German submarines of that size which, as Captain Rodgers has shown, were built 
to operate at a considerable distance from home shores, in an aggressive action. The 
quality of the information offered in support of what the German vessels had done appeared 
to be largely hearsay, coming, in one case, from an American boy returned from Germany 
where he had been impressed for a short time on a German submarine, in another case from 
information from an escaped sailor, and in other cases from information the sources of which 
have not been given. It is probable those sources of information are not wholly reliable, 
especially as to particulars, and it would not seem sound to base any important conclusion 
