TO THE NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 133 
As regards specialization, a point brought out by Captain Niblack—they specialize 
in the work in which Mr. Laurenti is chief engineer to this extent. If any workman or 
anybody in the plant, or in the country, brings up any question in connection with sub- 
marine design, the matter of the location of a valve stem, or the location of a certain 
cock, the size of the valve stem, or what not, this matter is given careful consideration, 
not by an assistant, a draughtsman, a foreman, or some other employee, but by Mr. 
Laurenti himself, and all the plans are carefully studied by him. Better still, in the case 
of a boat under construction, he will go to the boat and examine the particular section 
in connection with the change as proposed, or examine a full-sized model of the section 
made in wood. He sits down in the section, studies all the surroundings, and decides on 
the merits of the thing, made in wood and put in exactly the place as recommended. 
They have specialized to that extent—a much greater extent than we have specialized here. 
As regards the size of submarines, I would like to ask Captain Niblack as to what 
he would do in the case of the Panama situation. Captain Hovgaard brought up the 
Panama Canal situation very forcibly in his supposed war with England. I am interested 
in the Panama situation, as I expect to go there. I would hate to think of myself at Pa- 
nama, at war with England. You could imagine the condition we would be in there, 
with two terminals, and not a base within eight hundred miles, and the Panama Canal 
closed up as far as offensive operations were concerned. We must have boats which can 
go to sea and stay at sea, and go to other bases if Panama is closed up, and operate from 
those other bases as against Panama. 
THE PRESIDENT:—We will now call on Captain Rodgers to close the discussion on 
his paper. 
Captain Ropcers:—I am disposed to accept Mr. Roberts’ remarks, which Secre- 
tary Cox read, as a basis of my reply. I am, of course, well aware of Admiral Grant’s 
views as to the type of submarine which I have heard him advance before the General 
Board in Washington, but hitherto he has not been able to convert either the General Board 
or the Navy Department to his views. 
The coast-defense submarine of 500 tons seems to be necessary to protect the rear 
of the offensive fleet in its work abroad. The proper line of defense begins at the enemy’s 
coasts, provided we have sufficient force and control of communications behind it. In 
order to render the control of communications entirely complete, we must be secure at 
our own bases, and for that we need local defense of individual ports, which is suffi- 
ciently carried out by a small type of submarine operating on a small radius, and our 
500-ton boat is able to do that quite satisfactorily. The larger type of boat comes in for 
the offensive operations which Admiral Grant wants. It goes with the fleet, and it is as 
fast and as large as the constructive abilities of the nation enable us to make them. 
As to the Panama Canal, and the defense of it, in case of a possible war with En- 
gland suggested by a previous speaker, the English ships, or those of any hostile European 
nation, in going to the Panama Canal would have to pass our bases at Porto Rico, Guantana- 
mo and Key West, and a little farther over, New Orleans. They must pass inside our de- 
fensive lines and control all those points as they come in. Our protective operations 
would be conducted at those points by the local defense boats, while our big submarines 
would go abroad with the fleet and operate across the ocean as occasion might require. 
