140 NAVAL STATIONS AND NAVAL BASES. 
Is our particular policy which threatens trouble in a given locality, or with a 
given nation, vital to us, and does it threaten a vital interest of the other nation? 
Would a war in support of such policy involve us with other countries? 
How far will it be necessary for us to go to force our policy on the other coun- 
try, and, in case of war, to what limits would our people be willing to go to con- 
tinue it? 
Would both nations throw their entire strength and resources into a fight to 
the death—that is to say, would the war be a limited or unlimited one? 
Are there local (domestic) or foreign (international) complications which will 
force us to adopt a defensive strategy, or may we count on an offensive, or what 
would ever be in our case, situated as we are, an offensive-defensive ? 
In case of war, shall we attack at once or leave the initiative to the enemy? 
May we plan to fight with the nation as a unit behind us, or may we expect in- 
terference and confusion from local politics, or indifference and lack of public sen- 
timent to sustain the war? 
Let us, however, assume that wise statesmanship, patriotic sentiment and 
national spirit are back of us. 
Fortunately, in times of profound peace, naval strategy in the unobjectionable 
form of peace strategy enables us to absolutely forestall the possible actions of other 
countries in any given area, and, while enforcing our own policy, may make resist- 
ance or war inadvisable on the part of another country which may oppose such 
policy. Thus has the British Empire been consolidated. 
We recently, by treaty, secured control of the Nicaraguan canal route with the 
necessary terminal bases at the Corn Islands in the Atlantic, and in the Gulf of Fon- 
seca in the Pacific. We have, in our actual possession in the West Indies and in the 
Pacific, absolute treasure islands of strategy for the location of those advance and 
outlying bases necessary to supplement the fleet we are building, which will jointly 
guarantee us that measure of command of the sea as will give us the national se- 
curity which we all crave and which, at this moment, to our peril, we actually lack. 
It is merely a question of intelligently willing to do it, and then putting up the 
money. In doing it, in time of peace, we offend no innocent country, but we might 
bring on a war by undertaking even a small part of it during a time of strained re- 
lations. No one waits until it rains to begin repairing the roof. 
To establish ourselves securely within the political areas in which our manifest 
destiny lies not only removes temptation from other countries to try to overreach 
us, but protects us from that danger to ourselves which comes from using strong dip- 
lomatic language without the real power to make it good. The siren and lulling 
words of interested countries are not a safe foundation on which to build the na- 
tional defense. 
To outline our peace strategy, let us assume that, among all our navy yards 
and stations on the Atlantic coast, our two main bases, to be decided upon, are, 
say, New York and Norfolk. New York, as the assumed center, and Boston and 
Philadelphia on the periphery of the circle enclosing the main industrial area of 
