146 NAVAL STATIONS AND NAVAL BASES. 
We forget, in these piping times of peace, the hysterical cry for protection during the 
spring of ’98 when the supposed formidable Spanish fleet was frightening our sea coast 
towns of this very region. 
The few rocks at Hell Gate removed, the 8 miles separating Buzzards Bay from Cape 
Cod Bay deepened from 25 to 30 feet, a line of mines laid from Montauk to Marthas 
Vineyard, another from Provincetown to the Massachusetts main coast, and we have an 
interior perfected waterway in which fighting vessels of all descriptions can rendezvous. 
Each and all ready to combine within a few hours at any threatened point, and thus form- 
ing a continuous second line of defense instead of three separated squadrons or fleets— 
one at Sandy Hook, one in Narragansett Bay, and another at Boston—which cannot make 
a junction except offshore and possibly in the face of an enemy. 
Our fighting effectiveness is thus increased three-fold, and our mobility by the differ- 
ence resulting from the 411 miles around Nantucket as against smooth-water navigation of 
267 miles through the canal. 
The cost of deepening the canal will be less than one-third of that for a battleship, and 
about the same as proposed for the futile attempt to dredge a fast-filling channel at Pol- 
lock Rip. 
The merchant marine, humanity, and true patriotic preparedness all demand the im- 
provement of this inland, almost natural waterway. The lessons of the past, the forecast 
for the future, would seem to warrant no delay in its accomplishment. 
I am well aware that certain officers of the navy have limited their view to the fact 
that the defense of the coast is only an incidental function of the main fleet. This argu- 
ment may be good from the strictly professsional point of view, but does not embrace a 
plan based upon joint co-operation of all governmental bodies and looking towards the pro- 
tection of all interests. 
A second line of defense close to our shore may, in the final analysis, spell victory in- 
stead of defeat. 
The immeasurable benefit to the country at large through an inshore smooth-water 
route, and the incalculable increase in preparedness resulting therefrom, cannot be overesti- 
mated. The reason for this conclusion should be patent to all; certainly to the combined 
ability of a joint army and navy board, and to the Department of Commerce, which, if asked 
for its opinion, will, no doubt, in these days of deeper commercial ships, see the necessity of 
protecting them in time of war as well as of giving them increased safety in time of peace. 
ProressorR W. Hoveaarp, Member:—I take a great interest in the science of strat- 
egy, to which I have given much thought and study. Having lived fifteen years in this 
country, I naturally have become interested in the strategic problems that confront it, but 
I wish to have it clearly understood that what I am about to say is offered, not ina 
spirit of criticism or advice, which would be a presumption on my part, but merely as an 
objective, academic comment on the paper which is now before us for discussion. I feel the 
more tempted to take part in this discussion, because I consider the views presented by Cap- 
tain Niblack as so absolutely sound, and concur especially in the order of importance which 
he assigns to the various outlying strategic positions of the United States. There are cer- 
tain points, however, which, in the interest of the national defense, might be brought out 
more sharply. 
I wish first to emphasize the fact that outlying possessions, if not provided with ade- 
quate local defenses, and if the fleet is incapable of commanding under all circumstances 
