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NAVAL STATIONS AND NAVAL BASES. 147 
the strategic area in which they are situated, must form points of vulnerability, and that 
hence they must become a source of anxiety, danger and weakness in time of war. This I 
believe must be admitted to be the case at present with practically all the outlying posses- 
sions of the United States, including the Panama Canal, and so long as this condition lasts 
they are the opposite of an advantage. In a war with a superior naval power, such as Great 
Britain, or with a coalition of two or more naval powers of superior aggregate strength, all 
the outlying naval stations and bases are likely to fail in their main object, which is to offer 
points of supports for the fleet. Instead of that they are liable, like Port Arthur, to be- 
come traps for detached squadrons, and will sooner or later fall into the hands of the enemy, 
as happened to Kiautchau and the other German possessions in the Pacific. 
The Panama Canal stands supreme in importance among all outlying bases. Not only 
is the control and use of this waterway of the utmost direct strategic value to the United 
States, but its possession by an enemy will be of at least equal value to him. Ina war with 
a superior naval power, like Great Britain, or against two powers, one in the Pacific, one 
in the Atlantic, it seems very doubtful whether connection could be maintained between the 
mainland of the United States and one of the terminals of the canal. Most likely both 
terminals would be blockaded and, since the mobile garrison, unless considerably reinforced 
beyond its present strength, is entirely inadequate to resist a serious land attack, the fall 
of the position would be only a question of time. The English could, in fact, bring a prac- 
tically unlimited pressure to bear on it. If, then, the Canal Zone cannot be held, it will be 
necessary to render it inoperative, for instance, by letting the water out of the Gatun Lake, 
but as the lake would fill up again in two rainy seasons—z. e., within a year and a half or 
two years—it may be found advisable also to demolish the locks in case a longer war is 
anticipated. When, as in a war with Great Britain or an equivalent combination of powers, 
the fall of the canal could be predicted with tolerable certainty, it would evidently be 
wise to demolish the canal and to evacuate the zone at once on the outbreak of hostilities. 
This procedure would be analogous to the abandonment of untenable positions and the de- 
struction of bridges in land warfare. 
The remarks of Captain Niblack on Culebra seem to me extremely interesting and im- 
portant. The position of this island is indeed ideal, like that of St. Thomas, and it has the 
additional advantage of being much smaller, and, therefore, easier to defend. It appears also 
that a much larger harbor can be obtained, although this will, I suppose, involve a very 
considerable outlay in the construction of breakwaters and other extensive works. Pro- 
vided no insurmountable difficulties are encountered in such works, Culebra is indeed su- — 
perior to St. Thomas as a main base, but I believe that the latter island would nevertheless 
be valuable as a secondary or additional base for light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. 
Guam unquestionably takes the first rank as a naval base in the western Pacific. The 
present fortified positions in the Philippine Islands would be untenable in a war against 
Japan. Armies can be landed elsewhere on the islands and the positions can be taken from 
the rear, in the same way as Kiautchau, but a strong naval base at Guam would render such 
operations on the Philippine Islands extremely precarious. 
It is not here the place to go deeper into the highly interesting questions raised by 
Captain Niblack in this admirable paper, but I will refer to an article which I hope will 
soon appear in the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute, in which I have discussed the 
strategic conditions of the United States, first in war with Great Britain and secondly in a 
war with Japan and Germany. 
In conclusion I wish to repeat that when I speak of wars between this country and cer- 
