148 NAVAL STATIONS AND NAVAL BASES. 
tain other countries, I do so entirely from an academic point of view. Nowadays inter- 
national political relations change as in a kaleidoscope, so that in a strategic study the most 
important cases must be considered, irrespective of their present political probability. 
Captain W. L. RopcErs, Associate Member:—I believe that the military value of in- 
ternal waterways in time of war is overrated by the general public, and therefore I would 
like to address myself to one point in Captain Niblack’s paper, where he speaks of the ad- 
vantage of an internal waterway between Cape Cod and the Delaware. He speaks of it 
as an internal waterway and suggests that it is a line of interior communication. I would 
like to offer something on the opposite side of the position that he takes up. 
The line running from Cape Cod to New York and the capes of the Delaware lies 
along the arc of a circle, and the direct route between the two extremities is a chord. There- 
fore, in point of distance it has a disadvantage over the direct route and, if it is cut as a 
canal, it will have not only the disadvantage of distance but additional disadvantage in time 
on account of the slow speed which only is possible in an internal waterway. 
Some experiments were carried out in Germany when they were working on the Kiel 
Canal and elsewhere, and certain determinations were made as to speed through a canal 
(the resistance, of course, as everybody here knows, very much depends on the area of the 
cross-section of the canal) and they found in the case of a cross-section of waterway six 
times that of a ship, that at a speed of 6 knots the resistance was several times what the 
ship had in the open ocean. With the cross-section of a battleship, which is now between 
2,500 and 3,000 square feet, you would have to have from 15,000 to 18,000 feet of cross- 
section of canal in order to make a speed of 6 knots with a resistance six times that of 
the ship in the internal waterway. Any higher speed would be impracticable, so that the 
time element in concentration would be decidedly against the use of artificial waterways. 
We have at present a base at Narragansett Bay, and New York and the Delaware Bay are 
in the center of the industrial region of the United States. Our naval forces at the begin- 
ning of mobilization will always be there. We shall then have to mobilize before the enemy 
arrives on this coast, or else we must use the artificial waterways, if they exist, as a means 
of mobilization and concentration after the enemy has arrived. A concentration after the 
enemy is here is too late. He has taken the lead in the game of cards we are playing. 
If an internal waterway exists, we cannot do anything until we come out. If we 
are to come out, we must depend on the submarines and mine fields to keep a free area 
of ocean for the debouchment of the main fleet in case we are delayed in mobilizing. The 
same submarines will enable us to keep a free area of ocean for effecting our concentra- 
tion at sea equally as well as they will enable us to debouch after concentrating by artifi- 
cial waterways. 
THE CHAIRMAN :—This is a most interesting paper, but we have a very long program, 
and, unless some gentleman is anxious to say something, we shall ask Captain Niblack if he 
cares to close the discussion. s 
Captain A. P. Nisiack:—I have nothing further to say. 
Tue CHAIRMAN :—I am sure that you will all authorize me to thank Captain Niblack for 
this interesting paper and the interesting discussion which it has brought out, and in your 
behalf I do extend him our thanks. 
We will proceed to the next paper, No. 12, entitled “Refrigeration and Refrigerator In- 
sulation on Board Ship,” by Mr. Robert F. Massa. 
Mr. Massa presented the paper. 
i we 
