DETAILS OF NAVAL DESIGN FROM JUTLAND. 65 
have been, and probably were, many more fires, particularly on those ships which were 
blown up outright, but the above gives quite a complete list and one which contains differ- 
ent types of ships, so that deductions made therefrom should be sound. 
It will be found that, of these fires, many were entirely cordite fires, shells exploding 
in the vicinity of ammunition brought up and held ready to serve the secondary battery of 
large ships or the main battery of light cruisers and destroyers. In the Warspite, Colossus 
and Malaya fires of this type occurred, and in two of the three cases, at least, the fire ran 
right down the secondary battery on the side hit. In the Tiger a cordite fire was caused by 
a shell piercing the side armor and exploding inboard in an ammunition passage. Of the 
principal fires on the Southampton and Chester, both were cordite. In Q turret of the 
Lion and the two after turrets of the Derfflinger powder fires resulted from shell explo- 
sions, and the turrets and chambers below were completely burnt out to the magazine doors. 
On destroyers in general it would appear that, as might have been expected, one or two 
direct hits by large shells were enough to put the ship entirely or almost entirely out of 
commission. The same result followed from a few salvos from a light cruiser. Under these 
conditions fires broke out at once. The next natural thought which results is that on oil- 
burning destroyers severe oil fires should have occurred. This, however, does not seem to 
have been the case. Of the destroyers from which we have accounts, the Acasta, Onslow, 
Nestor, Nicator, Defender and Petard were all oil burning. All six suffered very heavily 
under attack by the enemy, and on the Acasta, Onslow, Defender and Petard there were 
severe fires. Yet of these four, on two only were there apparently oil fires, and in both 
cases the oil fires were overcome quickly and effectually. In the Petard an oil-fuel pipe was 
severed and the oil was set afire, but the oil was shut off and the fire stopped. The De- 
fender received a 12-inch shell sideways, froma ricochet, in the forward fire room and a 
fierce oil fire was started. This fire again was put out by hard and brave work. 
The deduction from this is that fuel oil does not seem the menace to light ships that it 
has at times been considered. However, this question brings up a point well worth intro- 
ducing. From an account of the battle in the book ‘Kiel and Jutland” by Von Hase, gun- 
nery officer of the Derfflinger, the inference is that every oil-burning British destroyer which 
was heavily hit burst into flames and the burning oil spread all over the ship. Such un- 
doubtedly was the appearance, as most of his observations of this kind were made at night, 
and all accounts show how terrible and awe inspiring was the sight of a ship on fire at night. 
However, the stories of those who were on the British destroyers that were severely damaged 
that night do not bear out the German record. This shows how careful we must be in ac- 
cepting reports made by any observer as to what happened on another ship, and in drawing 
deductions therefrom, and contrariwise how valuable are reports from those on board ship 
as to the events on that particular ship. 
When we consider fires in general, and eliminating cordite and oil fires, just discussed, 
the most serious seem to have occurred on the Warrior and Black Prince on the British side 
and the Lutzow on the German. Of the Black Prince we have no record except that she 
seemed completely on fire as she steamed along at high speed just before blowing up, but 
from the Warrior there are survivors whose records show that vessel to have been all on fire 
below decks from about amidships aft. However, both these ships were old armored cruis- 
ers, practically obsolete vessels for this kind of work, and both were under the concentrated 
fire of the High Seas Fleet for some time. The wonder is that they lasted as long as they 
