66 DETAILS OF NAVAL DESIGN FROM JUTLAND. 
did. Of the Lutzow, all we know is that she was heavily on fire and continued so until she 
was abandoned. 
Of the other ships under consideration, the accounts show that each shell explosion, par- 
ticularly below decks, left fires in its trail. Fora time, probably due to the enormously high 
temperatures generated, everything in the vicinity seemed to burn. Nevertheless, except in 
very serious cases, it seemed to be possible to cope with the fires most effectively in rather 
short order. Also, where some materials burned which had not been looked on as inflamma- 
ble, other materials which had been considered as possible sources of danger, as, in particular, 
the wood decks, gave no trouble in this respect. 
In dealing with these fires, the most serious difficulty was apparently the fact that in 
many cases the shell explosion which caused the fire completely wrecked the fire main and 
hoses in the vicinity. Besides putting the local fire-fighting equipment out of commission, 
water from the broken fire mains poured out on the decks and down below into engine rooms 
and other spaces where holes in decks or hatches existed. This possible cutting of fire 
mains seems a subject worthy of very particular study, and as a suggestion it would seem 
that shut-off valves with distant control gear, together with long emergency lengths of hose 
kept below protection, are necessary where fire-main risers pierce armor decks. 
Another point that was brought up in speaking of these fires was the danger to the fire 
parties from the sharp edges of torn decks and bulkheads and also from molten lead drop- 
ping from lead-sheathed electric cables. To meet the former point heavy boots and gloves 
should be supplied to fire parties, while to meet the menace of molten lead they might also 
be equipped with firemen’s helmets and leather jackets, for it seems impossible, or at least 
impracticable, to consider not running lead-sheathed cables overhead above the armor decks. 
Summing up the subject of fires, it would seem that, if anything, the fire menace proved 
to be in general less serious than had been expected. Many and most severe cordite and 
other powder fires did occur and showed the need for greater care of ready service ammuni- 
tion and more subdivision of the secondary guns. On the other hand, oil fuel did not seem 
a particularly potent source of danger. However, to meet conditions which will undoubt- 
edly exist, fire-fighting equipment should be kept up to the top notch. Design, moreover, 
should be such that, even with fire mains abave the armor deck damaged, it will still be pos- 
sible to obtain a supply of water for fire-fighting purposes. 
Outside of the main engines and boilers of a naval vessel, probably the most important 
item of her machinery is the steering gear. This, as anyone knows who has had to do with 
specifications, tests, or design of a steering gear, is a piece of apparatus which must meet 
the most severe conditions. Its work varies almost instantaneously from no load at all to 
heavy overload; the shocks of the sea must be met, and above all it must be ready for work 
whenever it is wanted, and all the time. 
In every naval vessel, at least, we specify very severe tests for the steering gear; hard- 
over to hard-over and back again in a few seconds with the vessel at its highest speed, going 
ahead, backing and swinging. It is to be feared, though, that we are all prone to heave 
rather a sigh of relief when the tests are over and say to ourselves that that is over, and 
the gear probably will not get another test like it in the course of the life of the ship. Now 
in that feeling and in that point of view this battle of Jutland shows us to be wrong, and 
to me this question of steering gear and how it should perform is one of the most important 
lessons gained from this study. 
