Ge, DETAILS OF NAVAL DESIGN FROM JUTLAND. 
REAR ADMIRAL ALBERT P. Nipiack, U. S. Navy, Vice-President:—I1 think that in pre- 
vious battles, like Tsushima, and even in our Spanish War, we learned the danger from fire 
to paint work on board ship, but the fires which this paper discusses are extremely interest- 
ing, as 1 had not seen the facts brought out in such a distinct way as is done by the author. 
The paper has particular value for this and other reasons. 
While modern shells are fitted with poison gases, the gases resulting from the explo- 
sion of any shell are in effect poisonous, whether intended so or not, and one of the valuable 
lessons we learned from the Battle of Tsushima was that the gases from shell explosion 
were taken up by the ventilating systems and distributed to where they could do the most 
harm. We must redesign our ventilating systems in some cases, but at any rate gas masks are 
a necessary part of ship equipment. 
As to the other interesting question of torpedo nets, I want to throw a little sidelight on 
it by saying that we have never had torpedo nets in our navy, and we have been unique in 
that respect. I was in Germany as naval attaché twice, and was there just before the war. 
I remember in 1912 a discussion on the question of torpedo nets for the German navy, and 
I was approached on the question several times as to why we had omitted them in this coun- 
try. The nets, when put around a ship, practically limit the speed of the ship to 10 knots. 
One reason given by a German authority for having them was psychological. It was argued 
that as a ship would be practically invulnerable if it were protected by nets, the crew would 
sleep better. That was the very opposite of our reasoning. We argued if you did not have 
nets you would be very much more alert, which in itself is a good argument. 
There is one little phase of thi§ question to which I will call attention, and that is, in a 
battle, in the falling of salvos, columns of water which are raised become positive sources of 
embarrassment to the ship, whether the shall hits or not, because of the great quantity of 
water going on board from a shot striking near the ship. It has been known to disarrange 
all the gun sights by deluging the optical instruments with water. I have not seen any data in 
this connection, in the Battle of Jutland, in regard to the extent to which the water from 
salvos got on board, and interfered with proper control, but this question of water coming 
on board was commented on in the battle of the Falkland Islands. The British ships in chas- 
ing the German ships suffered very seriously from water coming on board from shots, not 
actually striking the ship but striking near the ship. Many similar questions might be of 
further interest in discussion of the Battle of Jutland, but it will be some time before we get 
all of the details of that battle. 
CoMMANDER Emory Lanp (C. C.), U. S. Navy, Member:—Commander Howard de- 
serves the thanks of the Society for attacking a job in which so much digging into details is 
involved. He has produced some excellent results, and my only regret is that his paper is so 
brief; it is a sort of multum in parvo and we need more light. 
It appears to me that he might have included some comments on the question of shell 
hoists and their installation, which is a matter of major importance, although not necessarily 
a matter of major design. It will probably bea long time before there will be another Battle 
of Jutland, and I suggest that it would be a good idea for the council to ask Commander 
Howard to prepare a paper next year, in which the lessons that might be drawn from this 
battle could be brought out in further detail. This paper might well cover such subjects as 
water-tight doors, flooding systems, drainage systems, life-saving apparatus, signalling, com- 
munication systems such as the use of telephones and voice pipes. If records of these instal- 
