DETAILS OF NAVAL DESIGN FROM JUTLAND. 73 
lations are available, a paper covering them would form a valuable reference for all of us 
interested in design and construction work. Probably, by next year, additional German 
records will be available to supplement the present paper, which is of intense interest to 
all of us. 
We have to be cautious in installing what some of us call “gadgets” to take care of 
remote contingencies. It is hardly worth while to care for such remote contingencies in the 
design and construction of warships. | Every man who goes to sea has to take a chance, and 
from a reasonable point of view it is impracticable to attempt to cover what I choose to call 
remote contingencies. 
I am particularly interested in the steering-gear comments of Commander Howard, 
who has been intimately connected with steering-gear installations and specifications since 
he entered the Navy, and who is in an excellent position to give us some very valuable in- 
formation on this subject. He has probably written more submarine steering-gear specifica- 
tions than anyone else in the service. The importance of having very rigid tests for steering 
gears cannot be overestimated. Severe service tests are not only essential for emergency con- 
ditions existing in time of battle but also essential for many peace-time conditions which occur 
in maneuvering, docking, and where collision is to be avoided. One of the ablest British archi- 
tects of today has stated that the steering gear and propellers form the Achilles’ heel of mod- 
ern capital ships. 
I believe, if Commander Howard had touched on the submarine casualties in the war, 
he could have given us many examples of submarines being lost by virtue of their diving 
gear, or steering gear, or both, having been damaged. As a matter of fact, damage to these 
installations was the primary cause of the loss of a great many German submarines. 
After we get these installations on board ship, which is the province of the naval archi- 
tect and shipbuilder, it is the province of the operator to use them. One is useless without 
the other, and I should like to point a small moral to the effect that, if you do not use the 
things aboard ship in the way they are intended,they become useless. We have made a good 
many efforts from time to time to fight fire aboard ship, and put in rather complicated sys- 
tems; in one or two instances, one or two people aboard ship have used them. In other in- 
stances they have not been operated. We can take a number of leaves out of German prac- 
tice with regard to the installation of things of this kind, not only with respect to fire fight- 
ing apparatus, but, as Professor Hovgaard brought out, in counteracting flooding. Construc- 
tion and operation must go hand in hand, otherwise we get a lot of useless weight aboard ship 
which the personnel does not use in time of emergency. Sometimes this apparatus is not used 
because the men do not know how to use it, and in other cases it is not used because they 
will not use it. A watertight door which is open when the ship is damaged does not help 
much. We should take the experiences of the operators and incorporate these in our designs. 
Rear ApmiraL Davip W. Taytor (C. C.), U. S. Navy, Honorary Vice-President :— 
This is a paper which is of great value to the Transactions of the Society because it repre- 
sents research which has established actual facts, and when we have facts established a naval 
architect can proceed with much greater confidence to his problems than when he works with 
Opinions formed by arguments alone. 
Commander Howard showed, broadly speaking, that the vessels of war in the Battle of 
Jutland representing both sides functioned as designed. It was remarkable how well the 
offense overcame the defense, and, on the other hand, how well the defense stood off the 
offense. The defensive and offensive apparatus functioned more or less as designed. 
