246 BANQUET. 
be compelled to limit our fleet to eighteen capital ships and an indeterminate number of 
smaller craft. : 
I want to speak rather briefly tonight, because you have here men whom you will hear 
from, who will present to you, in a much more forcible way than I can, the merchant ma- 
rine problem. 
But I want first to emphasize this fact, so often forgotten by the American people, 
that a fleet is not a fleet if it consists only of combatant ships. We would be abso- 
lutely helpless on the occasion of a great war unless we were in a position to draw upon 
an adequate merchant marine. It would be altogether too expensive to provide for the greater 
ships of the fleet, for the smaller ships of the fleet, and for the air vessels of the fleet, the 
necessary auxiliaries, and maintain them, year after year, in times of peace. We cannot 
think of that. The American people would not tolerate that for a moment. 
We have had several examples in our history, pitiful examples, of what it means to 
attempt to operate away from the shores of the United States, without auxiliaries in suffi- 
cient number. 
You will not have forgotten, of course, the war with Spain, and you will not have for- 
gotten the efforts of our government in scraping all the ports of the world to get enough 
American bottoms, flying the American flag, to transport our little army of 25,000 men to 
Cuba, and you will not have forgotten, I am sure, that after our armada sailed, all in- 
formed Americans were, metaphorically speaking, on their knees in prayer that there should 
not come a heavy blow at sea, because they knew some of the vessels carrying these men 
could not weather a storm, and they would not reach the end of their cruise with their 
precious cargoes of American fighting men. 
I was on the deck of one of these auxiliaries serving as a sailor, and in the long distance 
we saw the fleet pass that was carrying the men to Cuba, and we literally prayed that there 
might be no rough weather. We knew the condition of the fleet, and everyone else knew it, 
but the Lord God of battles was with us, and the ships steamed on their way and landed 
their cargoes safely. (Applause. ) 
Then the United States went on after that demonstration, indifferent to the fact that a 
merchant marine is a vital necessity, until another striking illustration was given of what 
it means to attempt to send a fleet to sea on a distant mission without auxiliaries. 
When President Roosevelt, himself always a friend of the Navy and the merchant ma- 
rine (applause), sent the twelve battleships around the world, he was compelled to use for 
auxiliaries, repair ships, supply ships, refrigerating ships, hospital ships, and all the others 
that constituted the train of the fleet, foreign ships under a foreign flag, and it was obvious 
that, had the United States then been at war, this vast fleet could not have sailed, or if it had, 
would have been stranded in some foreign port because it could not carry enough supplies 
of any kind to finish its long voyage. 
I do not know whether or not the President had it in mind—but I have always thought 
he did—amongst other motives he may have had in sending the then greatest fleet that ever 
assembled under the American flag, around the world—I always thought he had the motive 
to demonstrate to our people the absolute and vital necessity of American ships under the 
American flag if we were ever to maintain our own in time of war. (Loud applause.) 
After war is declared you cannot get ships of other flags. It is quite obvious that you 
cannot sail without them, so I have thought that President Roosevelt probably wanted to 
