REFUELING WARSHIPS AT SEA. 161 



in accordance with their speed and fighting power, partly as a direct support for the 

 lighter ships, partly as reserves in the rear. The battle fleet is hidden away as safe 

 as possible from submarine attack. It may or may not be at sea. 



Great Britain was said to have no cruisers in the North Sea. Five have been 

 destroyed by submarines. Fifteen new cruisers will be ready within a few months. 

 Great Britain is reported to own 232 destroyers and 20 building. She also has 75 

 submarines. Perhaps half of the destroyers are employed on blockade duty in the 

 North Sea. 



All the ships are either fueling at sea or leaving the blockade (perhaps every 

 ten days) for the smooth waters of English harbors for refueling. Several have 

 been reported coaling at Harwich. 



Every time a cruiser retires from the patrolling line of the blockade to a shore 

 base for refueling, the blockade is materially weakened, for the absent ship is tempo- 

 rarily useless for fighting purposes, to say nothing of the danger of destruction by 

 submarines, lying in wait on the route to and from the coaling base. 



England has an abundant supply of cruisers at present and can afford to allow 

 15 per cent or 20 per cent of these ships to be absent from the blockade filling their 

 bunkers ; nevertheless, the efficiency of that blockade is materially weakened when- 

 ever the cruisers are withdrawn for refueling. So far as destroyers and submarines 

 are concerned, these are frequently relieved from blockade duty to refresh the per- 

 sonnel and the time consumed in refueling need not be time lost. If necessary to 

 change crews on light cruisers, transports could be used; this would allow each 

 cruiser to stay on duty continuously or nearly so. 



COALING WARSHIPS IN THE NORTH SEA. 



By way of example, suppose the British employ 100 cruisers for blockade duty 

 in the North Sea, costing an average of $2,000,000 each. This would represent a 

 total investment of $200,000,000. Practically all burn coal. Considering the dis- 

 tance to shore coaling ports, it is difficult to believe that more than 85 per cent of 

 these cruisers are maintained on blockade duty unless they refuel at sea. Fifteen 

 per cent of these ships absent coaling at a shore base represent a temporary weak- 

 ening of the blockading fleet of 1 5 ships, worth in money alone fully $30,000,000. 

 This blockading fleet of 100 cruisers could be maintained close to 100 per cent ef- 

 ficiency if served by colliers equipped to deliver coal to them under all reasonable 

 conditions of the sea. 



Does not this illustration serve to indicate the value of mastering the art of 

 refueling warships in a seaway? The U. S. colliers Jason and Orion, carrying 

 12,000 tons of coal, equipped with high-speed broadside coaling gear as well as 

 marine cableways to coal a warship in tow, would be ideal for North Sea service; 

 Such colliers could deliver to a cruiser in tow 500 tons of coal in the daylight hours, 

 steaming at 10 to 12 knots while doing so. When submarines are present ships must 

 keep moving at a speed of 10 knots at least. With 100 ships on blockade duty, burn- 



