APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 571 
tainty upon a point of jurisdiction or sovereignty would be productive of many and 
endless controversies and conflicts. A more practical limit of national jurisdiction 
upon the high seas was indispensably necessary, and this was found, as the Under- 
signed thinks, in fixing the limit at 3 miles from the coast. This limit was early 
proposed by the publicists of all maritime nations. While it is not insisted that all 
nations have accepted or acquiesced and bound themselves to abide by this rule 
when applied to themselves, yet three points involved in the subject are insisted 
upon by the United States: 
518 1. That this limit has been generally recognized by nations; 
2. That no other general rule has been accepted; and 
3. That if any State has succeeded in fixing for itself a larger limit, this has been 
done by the exercise of maritime power, and constitutes an exception to the general 
understanding which fixes the range of a cannon-shot (when it is made the test of 
jurisdiction) at 3 miles. So generally is this rule accepted, that writers commonly 
use the expressions of a range of cannon-shot and 3 miles as equivalents of each 
other. In other cases, they use the latter expression as a substitute for the former. 
And in a later communication on the same subject of the 10th August, 
1863, he observes: 
Nevertheless, it cannot be admitted, nor indeed is Mr. Tassara understood to claim, 
that the mere assertion of a Sovereign, by an act of legislation, however solemn, can 
have the effect to establish and fix its external maritime jurisdiction. His right to 
a jurisdiction of 3 miles is derived, not from his own Decree, but from the law of 
nations, and exists, even though he may never have proclaimed or asserted it by any 
Decree or Declaration whatsoever. He cannot, by a mere Decree, extend the limit 
and fix it at 6 miles, because, if he could, he could in the same manner, and upon 
motives of interest, ambition, or even upon caprice, fix it at 10, or 20, or 50 miles 
without the consent or acquiescence of other Powers which have a common right 
with himself in the freedom of all the oceans. Such a pretension could never be 
successfully or rightfully maintained. 
The same principles were laid down in a note addressed to Sir E. 
Thornton by Mr. Fish, then Secretary of State, on the 22nd January, 
1875. Mr. Fish there stated: “ We have always understood and asserted 
that pursuant to public law no nation can rightfully claim jurisdiction 
at sea beyond a marine league from the coast.” 
He then went on to explain the only two exceptions that were appar- 
ently known to him so far as the United States were concerned: certain 
Revenue Laws which admitted the boarding of vessels at a distance of 4 
leagues from the coast, which, he said, had never been so applied in 
practice as to give rise to complaint on the part of a foreign Govern- 
ment; and a Treaty between the United States and Mexico of 1848, in 
which the boundary-line between the two States was described as begin- 
ning in the Gulf of Mexico, 3 leagues from land. As regards this stipu- 
Jation, he observed that it had been explained at the time that it could 
only affect the rights of Mexico and the United States, and was never 
intended to trench upon the rights of Great Britain or of any other 
Power under the law of nations. 
It would seem, therefore, that Mr. Fish was entirely unaware of the 
exceptional jurisdiction in Behring’s Sea, which is now said to have 
‘been conceded by the United States to Russia from 1823 to 1867, trans- 
ferred to the United States, so far as the American coast was concerned, 
only eight years before he wrote, and which would presumably be still 
acknowledged by them as belonging to Russia on the Asiatic shore. L 
must suppose that when Mr. Blaine states that “both the United 
States and Great Britain recognized, respected, obeyed” the Ukase of 
1821, in so far as it affected Behring o’s Sea, he has some evidence to go 
upon in regard to the conduct of his country which is unknown to the 
world at large, and which he has not as yet produced. But I must be 
allowed altogether to deny that the attitude of Great Britain was such 
as he represents, or that she ever admitted by act or by sufferance 
the extraordinary claim of maritime jurisdiction which that Ukase 
contained. 
