636 APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
the coast south of the point of junction already described. Nothing is clearer than 
the reason for this provision. <A strip of land, at no point wider than 10 marine 
leagues, running along the Pacific Ocean from 54° 40’ to 60° (320 miles by geograph- 
ical line, by the windings of the coast three times that distance), was assigned to 
Russia by the IIIrd Article. Directly to the east of this strip of land—or, as might 
be said, behind it—lay the British possessions. To shut out the inhabitants of the 
British possessions from the sea by this strip of land, would have been not only 
unreasonable, but intolerable to Great Britain. Russia promptly conceded the privi- 
lege, and gave to Great Britain the right of navigating all rivers crossing that strip 
of land from 54° 40/ to the point of intersection with the 141st degree of longitude. 
Without this concession the Treaty could not have been made. I do not understand 
that Lord Salisbury dissents from this obvious construction of the VIth Article, for 
in his despatch he says that the Article has a “ restricted bearing,” and refers only 
to “the line of coast described in Article IIL” (the italies are his own), and the only 
line of coast described in Article III is the coast from 54° 40’ to 60°. There is no 
description of the coast above that point stretching along the Behring’s Sea from 
latitude 60° to the Straits of Behring. 
The VIIth Article of the Anglo-Russian Treaty, whose provisions have led to the 
principal contention between the United States and Great Britain, is as follows: 
“Tt is also understood that for the space of ten years from the signature of the 
present Convention the vessels of the two Powers, or those belonging to their respec- 
tive subjects, shall mutually be at liberty to frequent, without any hindrance what- 
ever, all the inland seas, the gulfs, havens, and creeks on the coast mentioned in 
Article III, for the purposes of fishing and of trading with the natives.” 
In the judgment of the President the meaning of this Article is altogether plain 
and clear. It provides that for the space of ten years the vessels of the two Powers 
should mutually be at liberty to frequent all the inland seas, &c., ‘‘on the coast men- 
tioned in Article IIT, for the purpose of fishing and trading with the natives.” Following 
out the line of my argument and the language of the Article, I have already main- 
tained that this privilege could only refer to the coast from 54° 40’ to the point of 
intersection with the 141st degree of west longitude; that therefore, British sub- 
jects were not granted the right of frequenting the Behring’s Sea. 
Denying this construction, Lord Salisbury says: 
“‘T must further dissent from Mr. Blaine’s interpretation of Article VII of the lat- 
ter Treaty (British). That Article gives to the vessels of the two Powers ‘liberty 
to frequent all the inland seas, gulfs, havens, and creeks on the coast mentioned in 
Article III, for the purpose of fishing and of trading with the natives.’ The expres- 
sion ‘coast mentioned in Article III’ can only refer to the first words of the Article, 
‘the line of demarcation between the possessions of the High Contracting Parties 
upon the coast of the continent and the islands of America to the north-west shall 
be drawn,’ &c., that is to say, it included all the possessions of the two Powers on the 
north-west coast of America. For there would have been no sense whatever in 
stipulating that Russian vessels should have freedom of access to the small portion 
of coast which, by a later part of the Article, is to belong to Russia. And, as bearing 
on this point, it will be noticed that Article VI, which has a more restricted bearing, 
speaks only of ‘the subjects of His Britannic Majesty’ and of ‘the line of coast 
described in Article III.’” 
It is curious to note the embarrassing intricacies of his Lordsbip’s language and 
the erroneous assumption upon which his argument is based. He admits that the 
privileges granted in the VIth Article to the subjects of Great Britain are limited 
to “the coast described in Article III of the Treaty.” But when he reaches the VIIth 
Article, where the privileges granted are limited to “the coast mentioned in Article 
Ill of the Treaty,” his Lordship maintains that the two references do not mean the 
same coast at all. The coast described in Article III and the coast mentioned in Article 
III are, therefore, in his Lordship’s judgment, entirely different. The “coast 
described in Article III” is limited, he admits, by the intersection of the boundary- 
line with the 141st degree of longitude, but the ‘‘coast mentioned in Article IIL” 
stretches to the Straits of Behring. 
The IlIrd Article is, indeed, a very plain one, and its meaning cannot be obscured. 
Observe that the “line of demarcation” is between the possessions of both parties 
on the coast of the continent. Great Britain had no possessions on the coast-line 
above the point of junction with the 141st degree, nor had she any Settlements 
above 60° north latitude. South of 60° north latitude was the only place 
47 where Great Britain had possessions on the coast-line. North of that point 
her territory had no connection whatever with the coast either of the Pacific 
Ocean or the Behring’s Sea. It is thus evident that the only coast referred to in 
Article III was this strip of land south of 60° or 59° 30’. 
The preamble closes by saying that the line of demarcation between the posses- 
sions on the coast ‘‘shall be drawn in the manner following,” viz.: From Prince of 
Wales Island, in 54° 40’, along Portland Channel and the summit of the mountains 
