APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 637 
parallel to the coast as far as their intersection with the 141st degree of longitude. After 
having described this line of demarcation between the possessions of both parties on 
the coast, the remaining sentence of the Article shows that, ‘‘ finally, from the said 
point of intersection, the said meridian-line . . . shall form the limit between the 
Russian and British possessions on the Continent of America.” South of the point of 
intersection the Article describes a line of demarcation between possessions on the 
coast; north of that point of intersection the Article designates a meridian-line as 
the limit between possessions on the continent. Theargument of Lord Salisbury appears 
to this Government not only to contradict the obvious meaning of the VIIth and IlIrd 
Articles, but to destroy their logical connection with the other Articles. In fact, 
Lord Salisbury’s attempt to make two coasts out of the one coast referred to in the 
IIIvd Article is not only out of harmony with the plain provisions of the Anglo- 
Russian Treaty, but is inconsistent with the preceding part of his own argument. 
These five Articles in the British Treaty (the IIIrd, IVth, Vth, VIth, and VIIth) 
are expressed with an exactness of meaning which no argument can change or per- 
vert. Ina later part of my note I shall be able, I think, to explain why the Russian 
Government elaborated the Treaty with Great Britain with greater precision and at 
greater length than was employed in framing the Treaty with the United States. 
It will be remembered that between the two Treaties there was an interval of more 
than ten months—the Treaty with the United States being negotiated in April 1824, 
and that with Great Britain in February 1825. During that interval something 
occurred which made Russia more careful and more exacting in her negotiations 
with Great Britain than she had been with the United States. What was it? 
It is only necessary to quote the IlIrd and IVth Articles of the American Treaty 
to prove that less attention was given to their consideration than was given to the 
formation of the British Treaty with Russia. The two Articles in the American 
Treaty are as follows: 
“Article Iil. It is, moreover, agreed that hereafter there shall not be formed by 
the citizens of the United States, or under the authority of the said States, any 
establishment upon the north-west coast of America, nor in any of the islands adja- 
cent, to the north of 54° 40’ of north latitude; and that, in the same manner, there 
shall be none formed by Russian subjects, or under the authority of Russia, south of 
the same parallel. 
“Article IV. It is, nevertheless, understood that during a term of ten years, count- 
ing from the signature of the present Convention, the ships of both Powers, or which 
belong to their citizens or subjects respectively, may reciprocally frequent, without 
any hindrance whatever, the interior seas, gulfs, harbours, and creeks upon the coast 
mentioned in the preceding Article, for the purpose of fishing and trading with the 
natives of the country.” 
It will be noted that in the British Treaty four Articles, with critical expression 
of terms, take the place of the IIIrd and IVth Articles of the American Treaty, 
which were evidently drafted with an absence of the caution on the part of Russia 
which marked the work of the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the British negotiation. 
From some cause, not fully explained, great uneasiness was felt in certain Russian 
circles, and especially among the members of the Russian-American Company, when 
the Treaty between Russia and the United States was made public. The facts leading 
to the uneasiness were not accurately known, and from that cause they were exag- 
gerated. The Russians who were to be affected by the Treaty were in doubt as to 
the possible extent implied by the phrase ‘‘north-west coast of America,” as referred 
to in the IIIrd and IVth Articles. The phrase, as I have before said, was used in 
two senses, and they feared it might have such a construction as would carry the 
American privilege to the Straits of Behring. They feared, moreover, that the 
uncertainty of the coast referred to in Article III might, by construction adverse to 
Russia, include the Behring’s Sea among the seas and gulfs mentioned in Article IV. 
If that construction should prevail, not only the American coast, but the 
48 coast of Siberia and the Aleutian coasts, might also be thrown open to the 
ingress of American fishermen. So great and genuine was their fright that 
they were able to induce the Russian Government to demand a fresh discussion of 
the Treaty before they would consent to exchange ratifications. 
It is easy, therefore, to discern the facts which caused the difference in precision 
between the American and British Treaties with Russia, and which at the same time 
give conclusive force to the argument steadily maintained by the Government of the 
United States. These facts have thus far only been hinted at, and I have the right 
to presume that they have not yet fallen under the observation of Lord Salisbury. 
The President hopes that after the facts are presented the American contention will 
no longer be denied or resisted by Her Majesty’s Government. 
