638 APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
Nearly eight months after the Russo-American Treaty was negotiated, and before 
the exchange of ratifications had yet taken place, there was a remarkable interview 
between Secretary Adams and the Russian Minister. I quote from Mr, Adams’ 
diary, the 6th December, 1824: ‘ 
“6th, Monday.—Baron Tuyl, the Russian Minister, wrote me a note requesting an 
immediate interview, in consequence of instructions received yesterday from his 
Court. He came, and, after intimating that he was under some embarrassment in 
executing his instructions, said that the Russian-American Company, upon learning 
the purport of the North-West Coast Convention concluded last June by Mr. Mid- 
dleton, were extremely dissatisfied (‘a jetée de hauts cris’), and, by means of their 
influence, had prevailed upon his Government to send him these instructions upon 
two points. One was that be should deliver, upon the exchange of the ratifications 
of the Convention, an explanatory note purporting that the Russian Government did 
not understand that the Convention would give liberty to the citizens of the United 
States to trade on the coast of Siberia and the Aleutian Islands. The other was to 
propose a modification of the Convention, by which our vessels should be prohibited 
from trading on the north-west coast north of latitude 57°. With regard to the 
former of these points he feft with me a Minute in writing.” 
With this preliminary statement Baron Tuyl, in accordance with instructions from 
his Government, submitted to Mr. Adams the following note: 
“ Kueplanatory Note from Russia. 
“‘Explanatory note to be presented to the Government of the United States at the 
time of the exchange of ratifications, with a view to removing with more certainty 
all occasion for future discussions; by means of which note it will be seen that the 
Aleutian Islands, the coasts of Siberia, and the Russian possessions in general on the north- 
west coast of America to 59° 30' of north latitude are positively excepted from the 
liberty of hunting, fishing, and commerce stipulated in favour of citizens of the 
United States for ten years. 
“This seems to be only a natural consequence of the stipulations agreed upon, for 
the coasts of Siberia are washed by the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Kamschatka, and 
the Icy Sea, and not by the South Sea mentioned in the Ist Article of the Convention 
of the 5th (17th) April, 1824. The Aleutian Islands are also washed by the Sea of 
Kamschatka, or Northern Ocean. 
“« It is not the intention of Russia to impede the free navigation of the Pacific Ocean. 
She would be satisfied with causing to be recognized, as well understood and placed 
beyond all manner of doubt, the principle that beyond 59° 30/ no foreign vessel can 
approach her coasts and her islands, nor fish or hunt within the distance of 2 marine 
leagues. This will not prevent the reception of foreign vessels which have been 
damaged or beaten by storm.” 
The course pursued by Mr. Adams, after the Russian note had been submitted to 
him, is fully told in his diary, from which I again quote: 
“T told Baron Tuy] that we should be disposed to do every thing to accommodate 
the views of his Government that was in our power, but that a modification of the 
Convention could be made no otherwise than by a new Convention, and that the con- 
struction of the Convention as concluded belonged to other Departments of the Gov- 
ernment, for which the Executive had no authority to stipulate. . . . I added 
that the Convention would be submitted immediately to the Senate; that if any- 
thing affecting its construction, or, still more, modifying its meaning, were to be 
presented on the part of the Russian Government before or at the exchange of the 
ratitfications, it must be laid before the Senate, and,could have no other possible 
effect than of starting doubts, and, perhaps, hesitation, in that body, and of favour- 
ing the views of those, if such there were, who might wish to defeat the 
49 ratification itself of the Convention. . . . If, therefore, he would permit 
me to suggest to him what I thought would be his best course, it would be to 
wait for the exchange of the ratifications, and make it purely and simply; that after- 
wards, if the instructions of his Government were imperative, he might present the 
note, to which I now informed him what would be, in substance, my answer. It 
necessarily could not be otherwise. But, if his instructions left it discretionary 
with him, he would do still better to inform his Government of the state of things 
here, of the purport of our conference, and of what my answer must be if he should 
present the note. I believed his Court would then deem it best that he should not 
present the note at all. Their apprehension had been excited by an interest not very 
Friendly to the good understanding between the United States and Russia. Our merchants 
would not go to trouble the Russians on the coast of Siberia, or north of the 57th degree of 
latitude, and it was wisest not to put such fancies into their heads. Atleast the Imperial 
Government might wait to see the operation of the Convention before taking any 
further steps, and J was confident they would hear no complaint resulting from it. If 
they should, then would be the time for adjusting the construction or negotiating a 
modification of the Convention.” . . . 
